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When the Surgeon Has HIV: What to Tell Patients
About the Risk of Exposure and the Risk of
Transmission
Phillip L. Mclntosh*
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1985, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) acknowledged that
infected health care workers can transmit the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV), the generally recognized source of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS),' to patients. 2 Since that time, the medical
and legal literature has discussed the issues of risk to patients, informed
consent, privacy, confidentiality, and discrimination against infected
health care workers raised by this possibility. In the legal literature,
journal articles have appeared with regularity since at least 1989.1 The
* Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.S. 1977, J.D. 1978,
Louisiana State University; LL.M. 1980, New York University. The author wishes to thank
Professors Jeffrey Jackson and Carol West of the Mississippi College School of Law for their
helpful comments and critiques of draft versions of this article. The work on this article was
supported in part by a summer research grant by the Mississippi College School of Law.
1. HIV is a retrovirus which has been identified as the cause of AIDS. HIV is believed to
destroy T-lymphocytes, a type of white blood cell which helps protect the body from infection.
The destruction of these cells allows opportunistic diseases to develop in the infected person.
Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in AIDS LAW TODAY:
A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 18, 21-23 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993) (hereinafter AIDS LAW).

The definition of AIDS has changed over time and has become more inclusive of various medical
conditions following HIV infection so that the distinction between HIV infection and AIDS is
becoming medically less significant. Id. at 35-37. There are those, however, who dissent from
the consensus that HIV and AIDS are related. Kary B. Mullis et al., Dissenting on AIDS: The
Case Against the HIV-Causes-AIDS Hypothesis, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 15, 1994, at G I.
2. CDC, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotrophic Virus Type Ill/LymphadenopathyAssociated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 681 (1985)
[hereinafter 1985 CDC Recommendations].

3. For articles discussing the patient's right to informed consent when a health care worker
is HIV-positive, see, for example, Barbara M. Anderson, "First Do No Harm . . . ." Can
Restrictions on HIV-Infected Health Care Workers Be Justified?, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 603
(1993); Mark Barnes et al., The HIV-Infected Health Care Professional: Employment Policies and
Public Health, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 311 (1990); Dorothea Beane, AIDS Crisis and the
Health Care Community: Public Concerns Triggering Questionable Private Rights of Action for
Emotional Harms and Legislative Response, 45 MERCER L. REV. 633 (1994); Mary A. Bobinski,
Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients From Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291
(1994) [hereinafter Autonomy and Privacy]; Mary A. Bobinski, Risk and Rationality: The Centers
for Disease Control and the Regulation of HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 36 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 213 (1991) [hereinafter Risk and Rationality]; Steven Eisenstat, The HIV Infected Health Care
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issues raised by HIV infection of health care workers have also arisen
in lawsuits in the courts 4 and have been addressed, at least in part, in
legislative and regulatory bodies.5 This Article joins this ongoing
discussion. The focus of this Article is on surgeons because they
regularly perform the types of invasive procedures that present the most
serious risks associated with HIV transmission to patients by health care
workers.
A. A Hypothetical

As an illustration of the problems raised by HIV-infection in
surgeons, consider the following hypothetical. Dr. A, a well-respected
obstetric surgeon,6 recently discovered that he is infected with HIV. He

has not yet shown any clinical symptoms of AIDS and feels healthy and
fit. He is optimistic that he has several years of good health ahead. He

Worker: The New AIDS Scapegoat, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 301 (1992); Larry Gostin, Hospitals,
Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: the "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals and
Patients, 48 MD. L. REv. 12 (1989); Scott H. Isaacman, The Other Side of the Coin: HlV-Infected
Health Care Workers, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 439 (1990); Gordon G. Keyes, Health-Care
Professionals with AIDS:
The Risk of Transmission Balanced Against the Interests of
Professionals and Institutions, 16 J.C. & U.L. 589 (1990); Theodore R. LeBlang, Obligations of
HIV-Infected Health Professionals To Inform Patients of Their Serological Status: Evolving
Theories of Liability, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 317 (1994); Karen C. Lieberman & Arthur R.
Derse, HIV-Positive Health Care Workers and the Obligation to Disclose: Do Patients Have a
Right to Know?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 333 (1992); Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, HIV-Infected Health
Care Professionals and Informed Consent, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 299 (1993).
Commentators have also written a number of articles dealing with discrimination and HIV testing
policy with reference to health care workers. A number of student comments and notes have
discussed informed consent and discrimination issues as well. Of course, these issues also have
been discussed regularly in medical journals.
4. Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995) (discrimination);
Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993)
(discrimination), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994); Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820
(5th Cir. 1990) (discrimination and privacy); Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (discrimination); Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
(discrimination); Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (various theories of
infliction of emotional distress, including. technical battery for failure to disclose infection and fear
of AIDS); Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1200 (i11.App. Ct. 1994) (fear of AIDS
following use of a needle on a patient after a needle stick incident), appeal denied, 645 N.E.2d
1357 (III. 1994); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993) (informed consent); K.A.C. v.
Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995) (various theories for infliction of emotional distress
including informed consent, battery, and fear of AIDS); Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at
Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. 1991) (confidentiality and discrimination); In re Milton S.
Hershey Med. Ctr., 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993) (confidentiality).
5. See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
6. Percutaneous injury rates are highest among obstetricians and gynecologists. Adelisa L.
Panlilio et al., Serosurvey of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B Virus, and Hepatitis C
Virus Infection Among Hospital-Based Surgeons, 180 J. AM. C. SURGEONS, 16, 21 (1995).
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is concerned, however, about whether to tell his patients about his
infection.
Dr. A understands that he presents a risk of exposing patients to his
infected blood, should he cut himself or sustain a needlestick injury
during an exposure-prone surgery.7 Like many surgeons, if not most,
he has sustained an occasional cut or needlestick during surgery. 8 He
also understands that such an exposure incident presents a very small
risk that the virus will be transmitted to his patient, resulting in HIV
infection (seroconversion). 9
Dr. A knows that most of his patients would want to know that their
surgeon is HIV-infected and that they would feel that he had denied
them their right to self-determination and control over their medical
treatment by withholding this information. 0 They likely would feel that
he subjected them to an unnecessary risk because they could have
avoided exposure and possible transmission of a fatal disease or could
have reduced the likelihood of such occurrences. Patients could elect
to seek a surgeon who is not infected or is unlikely to be infected. Dr.
A also knows that if an exposure incident occurs, current recommendations of the CDC call for testing of the exposed person for HIV." He
suspects that, should testing be recommended or required, exposed
patients likely will need counseling to help them cope with the
potentially serious emotional stress connected with exposure and its
aftermath.' 2 He also expects that some patients likely will sue him for
failure to disclose his infection, should they discover it, whether they
are actually infected or not.

7. See infra text accompanying notes 73-82. Exposure-prone procedures are procedures that
include the by-feel manipulation of a needle with the fingertips, or that include the presence of the
surgeon's finger's along with a sharp instrument in a tightly confined body cavity or in a place
where the surgeon cannot easily see the instrument. CDC, Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During
Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 4 (Supp. RR8, July 12, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 CDC Recommendations].
8. See infra text accompanying notes 74-77.

9. See infra text accompanying notes 86-94.
10. See Barbara Gerbert et al., HIV-Infected Health Care Professionals: Public Opinion
About Testing, Disclosing, and Switching, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 313, 316 (1993) (74%
of patients surveyed would switch from an infected surgeon, but only 37% would switch from an
infected physician for routine health care).
II. See 1985 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 681-86, 691-92; CDC, Recommendations For Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type
Ill/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus DuringInvasive Procedures,35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 221, 222-23 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 CDC Recommendations].
12. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
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On the other hand, Dr. A knows that if he discloses his infection, he
likely will lose his surgical practice. 13 Though shifting to another type
of practice would avoid the risks of exposure and transmission, such a
transition likely would be difficult and costly. It would require retraining, possible relocation, and a host of other problems. He also fears
that disclosure would invade his privacy and have a serious impact on
his private life. He believes that such a negative impact is an unnecessary result given such a small risk. Moreover, in his view, a disclosure
requirement would unnecessarily discriminate against him because the
infection will not affect his medical skills for some time to come, if
ever.
Dr. A is struggling with the moral, legal, and practical issues
involved in deciding whether to continue his surgical practice. If he
chooses to continue his practice, he must decide whether he should
volunarily tell his patients of his infection. He is also concerned about
how to respond to patients who ask specifically if he is HIV-free. He
knows that if he tells those patients the truth, the impact on his practice
and his private life is likely to be the same as if he volunteers the
information.
B. The Scope of This Article
This Article explores the legal aspects of the dilemma, illustrated by
the foregoing hypothetical, facing an HIV-infected surgeon with respect
to whether the doctrine of informed consent requires, or can require,
disclosure of the surgeon's HIV-infection under some circumstances.
This Article then examines the nature of the risks associated with HIV
as they affect patients during surgery. Next, this Article evaluates
whether the risks are sufficiently material to require disclosure (or at
least to present a jury question), and, in any event, whether state law
can require such disclosure under the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA). 14 In particular this Article examines the doctrine of
informed consent as some states have applied it to HIV-infected
surgeons and how other states that use a patient-centered standard of
disclosure," as opposed to a physician-centered approach, 16 may apply

13. Even if a surgeon discloses his infection to the hospital where he is on staff, he may lose
his surgical privileges. See, e.g., Doe v.University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 126263 (4th Cir. 1995).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).

15. This approach to informed consent requires that a physician disclose, at a minimum, the
risks of a proposed treatment which would be material to a decision by a reasonable patient in
deciding on a course of action with respect to the proposed treatment.
16. A physician-centered standard considers what a reasonable physician would disclose
about risks in evaluating the materiality of a risk and whether disclosure is required. See infra
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the doctrine. In the process of this examination, the Article considers
two related but separate risks present when an HIV-infected surgeon
performs surgery: the risk of exposure and the risk of transmission.
The former risk involves the risk of blood-to-blood contact between an
infected surgeon and a patient. The latter risk involves the risk of
seroconversion or actual infection following exposure to HIV-infected
blood. To date, most of the discussions in the legal and medical
literature have focused on the risk of transmission. The risk of
exposure, however, is an important risk to patients and deserves serious
consideration in the debate over disclosure by infected surgeons.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The discussions about HIV-infected health care workers took on an
added urgency in 1990 with the CDC's report of the possible transmission of HIV by a dentist to a patient during an invasive dental procedure. 7 This report ignited a swirl of controversy surrounding Kimberly
Bergalis, the young woman later identified as the infected patient.'"
The CDC ultimately concluded that dentist David Acer infected six
patients, including Ms. Bergalis, with HIV. 9 As a result of the widely
publicized Bergalis story, many members of the public expressed
concern about the risk of infection at the hands of their health care
providers. Moreover, health authorities began an ongoing debate about
the health care policy implications. 2"
The public controversy, however, did not begin with Ms. Bergalis.
In 1985, a Florida newspaper reported that a Florida surgeon continued
to practice after he developed classic symptoms of AIDS. 2' The CDC's
investigation indicated that the surgeon had not infected any patients
and that nothing suggested that he should discontinue his practice. 22
Nearly four years later in Nashville, Tennessee, another surgeon became
the center of controversy when local television news broadcasts and
newspaper articles revealed that he had continued to practice while
notes 57-62 and accompanying text. The states are nearly evenly divided in their application of
the patient-centered approach and the physician-centered approach: See infra notes 57-70 and
accompanying text.
17. See CDC, Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient during
an Invasive Dental Procedure, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 489 (1990).
18. See Dennis L. Breo, Meet Kimberly Bergalis-the Patient in the "Dental AIDS Case,'
264 JAMA 2018, 2018 (1990).
Investigations of Persons Treated by HIV-Infected Health-Care
19. CDC, Update:
Workers-United States, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 329, 329 (1993).
20. Gerbert et al., supra note 10, at 313.
21. Steve Steinberg, MD's AIDS Didn't Infect His Patients: Study Finds 400 OK; Surgeon
Died in '83, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 17, 1985, at IA.
22. Id.
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infected with HIV." As with the Florida surgeon, a follow-up study
found no evidence of transmission of HIV to patients. 24 Accordingly,
the David Acer cases, and in particular the infection of Kimberly
Bergalis, stirred the greatest public response because they involved the
actual, not merely the potential, transmissions of HIV to patients by a
health care worker. While the CDC still believes that the dentist was
the source of the patients' infections, the method of transmission
remains a mystery.25 Other than the David Acer cases, no cases of
actual transmission of HIV by a health care worker to a patient have
been reported.
The AIDS epidemic is an ongoing health care crisis in the United
States and throughout the world. Most experts estimate that between
600,000 and 800,000 people in the United States are infected with
HIV.26 The number of AIDS cases occurring in the United States since
1981 is over 440,000, with over 250,000 deaths from AIDS or AIDSrelated causes. 27 AIDS is now the leading cause of death of Americans
from ages 25 to 44.2" Despite some advances in treatment, 29 any cure
and a preventative vaccine are years away at best.30 Most experts
23. Frank S. Rhame, The HIV-Infected Surgeon, 264 JAMA 507, 507 (1990).
24. Ban Mishu et al., A Surgeon with AIDS: Lack of Evidence of Transmission to Patients,
264 JAMA 467, 469-70 (1990).
25. Carol A. Ciesielski et al., The 1990 Florida Dental Investigation: The Press and the
Science, 121 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 886, 888 (1994).
26. Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World; Obstacle-Strewn Road to Rethinking the
Numbers on AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at C3. In 1991 the CDC estimated the number of
infected persons in the United States to be at least one million. Occupational Exposure to
Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004, 64,014 (1991). Estimates vary on the number of
physicians and surgeons that are infected with HIV. The CDC has estimated that of approximately
4,500,000 health care workers, there are 5000 infected physicians, 360 infected surgeons, 1200
infected dentists, and 35,000 other infected health care workers. Betsy A. Lehman, AIDS Tests
for Health Caregivers?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1992, at 27. Others estimate that there are
70,000 health care workers with HIV, including 7000 doctors. Huntly Collins, A Bitter Pill for
Doctors, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1993, at 7 (reporting the estimate of the Medical Expertise Retention
Program). Others at the CDC have estimated that there are possibly 1000 surgeons with HIV
infection. Transmission of HIV from Infected Dentists to Their Patients; Policy Statements Issued
for Physicians, AIDS WKLY., Jan. 21, 1991, at 2. In 1988, approximately 120,000 male physicians
engaged in surgical specialties. Rhame, supra note 23, at 507.
27. Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Is Now the Leading Killer of Americans from 25 to 44, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at C7 [hereinafter Leading Killer]. Worldwide, the World Health
Organization estimates that 17 million persons are HIV-infected and 4 million have AIDS.
Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World: After Setback, First Large AIDS Vaccine Trials Are
Planned,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at C3.
28. Altman, Leading Killer, supra note 27, at C7.
29. David E. Rogers & June E. Osbom, Sounding Board: Another Approach to the AIDS
Epidemic, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 806, 806 (1991).
30. Lawrence K. Altman, Little ProgressSeen in Effort to Crack AIDS Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1993, § 1, at 5.
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believe that AIDS is nearly always fatal, although between five and ten
percent of HIV-infected persons have lived for more than ten years with
the virus and have shown no symptoms of AIDS. 3
HIV is spread by the exchange of certain bodily fluids such as semen,
blood, vaginal secretions, and breast milk. 2 Transmission is known to
occur by engaging in sexual intercourse with an infected person or by
using HIV-contaminated needles.33 In addition, transmission may occur
by having parenteral, mucous membrane, or non-intact skin contact with
infected blood, blood components, or blood products.34 Transmission
also can occur through semen used for artificial insemination and
between mother and child during pregnancy.3 5 HIV is not spread by
casual contact.36
AIDS has been called "perhaps the most political of all diseases." 37
AIDS has created a public health crisis and a political uproar for a
number of reasons. First, it is almost inevitably fatal.38 Second, HIV
infection is spread primarily through sexual activity or sharing drug
needles.3 9 Third, AIDS has been strongly associated with the gay
community and intravenous drug users.4" Fourth, the disease's manner
of progression is often long and tortuous.4' Finally, there is fear of HIV
and AIDS spreading into the general population.42 In essence, public
fear of contagion and widespread disapproval of the lifestyle of gays
and drug users have led to discrimination and prejudice against those
known to be HIV-infected or suspected of having the infection.43 Some
. 31.

Lawrence K. Altman, Long-Term Survivors May Hold Key Clues to Puzzle of
AIDS, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995, at Cl.
32. Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004, 64,014-15 (1991).
33. Id. at 64,015.
34. Id.
35. Id. The exact means of transmission between mother and child is not known. See BrettSmith & Friedland, supra note I, at 27-28.
36. Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 1, at 23-24.
37. Hoping for Another Dr. Koop: Clinton Must Rethink AIDS Post Before Naming a
Successor to Gebbie, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at B6.
38. Only 5%-10% of those infected fail to exhibit symptoms within 10 years of infection.
Altman, supra note 31, at Cl.
39. Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note I, at 24-27.
40. Eighty-one percent of AIDS cases involve homosexual men, bisexual men, or intravenous
drug users. Occupational Exposure to Bloodbome Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004, 64,015 (1991).
Another 7% involve homosexual or bisexual contact and intravenous drug use. Id.
41. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note I, at 33-38 (discussing the stages following HIV
infection).
42. See Altman, Leading Killer, supra note 27, at C7 (discussing the spread of AIDS among
heterosexuals).
43. Public opinion polls continue to show that a majority of Americans disapprove of a
homosexual lifestyle. See, e.g., Robert Davis, Poll: Women More Tolerant, USA TODAY, April
26, 1993, at IOA.
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evidence, however, indicates that attitudes toward HIV-infected persons
are gradually softening."
At the same time, the public's fears and the political efforts of AIDS
activist groups have prompted enormous governmental funding of
research and other AIDS-related programs. 45 Additionally, evincing
concern for privacy, states have enacted laws to protect the confidentiality of infected persons. 4 6 Moreover, the ADA, 47 the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 4 and various state statutes and municipal laws49 protect HIVinfected persons and those with AIDS against discrimination.

III.

THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT

The doctrine of informed consent has become an important legal doctrine in tort law concerning medical negligence. Aaron Twerski and
Neil Cohen 5have
noted that the volume of literature on the subject is
"staggering." ° Despite the doctrine's importance as reflected by the
number of reported cases and the volume of academic literature, the
doctrine is still rough and problematic. 5 In the context of HIV-infected
surgeons, the scope of the doctrine must be defined as it faces issues of
patient autonomy, the privacy and economic interests of the surgeon,
discrimination, and risk assessment. The ultimate question is whether
a patient's interest in near-absolute autonomy in deciding whether and

44. See Gerbert et al., supra note 10, at 315-16 (discussing a 1991 telephone survey
indicating that, while fewer Americans would refuse to allow infected health care workers to work
than in 1988, and fewer would switch from HIV-infected doctors, the majority would still restrict
the practices of infected health care workers and would switch to uninfected physicians).
45. The National Institutes of Health estimated that government expenditures on AIDS would
total $1.3 billion in 1994. Judy Foreman, Despite Toll, Arthritis Gets Scant Attention, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 18, 1994, at 25.
46. See Scott Burris, Testing. Disclosure, and the Right to Privacy, in AIDS LAW, supra note
1,at 115, 121.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993). Regarding the possible application of the
ADA to informed consent, see infra text accompanying notes 180-84.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
49. See Arthur S. Leonard, Discrimination, in AIDS LAW, supra note 1,at 297, 311.
50. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts:
The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 609 n.8.
51. See id. (presenting the view that the doctrine does not adequately serve its intended
function of patient autonomy because of the limitations imposed by causation requirements); see
also Jon F. Mertz, On a Decision-Making Paradigm of Medical Informed Consent, 14 J. LEGAL
MED. 231 (1993) (suggesting improvements to the informed consent inquiry and pointing out the
tensions between the subjectivity of decision making and the objective constraints of negligence
law): Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994) (arguing that the
doctrine needs to be reshaped to allow for differentiation in the various contexts in which the
doctrine applies because in its present form, it is neither cost-effective nor refined enough to work
well).
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when to submit to medical treatment by a particular physician should
yield to the physician's personal interests or to society's interests.
The history and general development of the informed consent

doctrine have been the subject of numerous articles, texts, and treatises.52 Accordingly, for purposes of this Article, a brief description of the
doctrine will suffice. The origins of the doctrine are found in the
courts' recognition of the autonomy of a patient to determine what is to
be done to her own body 3 and the fiduciary nature of the physicianpatient relationship. 4 In the context of medical treatment, the doctrine
of informed consent simply means that a patient has a right to the
disclosure by her physician of information sufficient to allow the patient
to make "an informed and intelligent decision on whether to submit to
a proposed treatment."5 5
The courts, however, have limited the
enforceability of this right to autonomy by requiring the patient to prove
that the failure to disclose resulted in consequences that a reasonable
patient would have chosen to avoid by foregoing the treatment.56

52. See. e.g., Twerski & Cohen, supra note 50, at 609 n.8 (citing a number of articles).
53. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 411 (La. 1988). Some courts have
recognized that the right of autonomy in making decisions about medical treatment is part of the
constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 414.
54. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Lieberman & Derse,
supra note 3, at 351-55.
55. Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 411.
56. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91. Two states, however, require plaintiffs to prove only
that they were harmed, that the risk should have been disclosed, and that they would have chosen
to avoid the risk had they been aware of it. See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla.
1979); Arena v. Gingrich, 748 P.2d 547, 549 (Or. 1988). In Hawaii, the plaintiff must prove that
harm occurred and that the plaintift, acting in a reasonable and rational manner, would have
avoided the treatment had appropriate disclosure of the risk of that harm been made. Leyson v.
Steuermann, 705 P.2d 37, 47 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985). The causation requirement has been criticized
as having the practical effect of depriving patients of a truly effective right to autonomy because
"a patient can prevail ... only if a reasonable patient, after being appropriately informed of the
risks of a procedure which is safe enough to be reasonable to propose [otherwise the claim would
be based on medical malpractice], would decline the procedure nonetheless," a matter of some
difficulty to prove. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 50, at 619. Twerski and Cohen contend that
the right to informed consent is a "process right" which should be independently valued, and not
dependent solely on causation of a physical harm. Id. at 649. Courts should recognize that there
is a range of reasonable responses that a patient might make to a proposed procedure, rather than
only one. This legal approach would provide flexibility, important because patients vary in their
values and priorities without necessarily being unreasonable. Thus, one patient might be
reasonable in regarding a risk as material based on a reasonable ordering of priorities while another
might reasonably consider the same risk immaterial. The proposal of a procedure by a physician
may be reasonable because some people, acting within a reasonable range, would regard it as
reasonable, even if others would reject the procedure. The fact that "reasonable people" may
disagree about what is reasonable is illustrated in the debate over whether it is even ethical for
infected surgeons to perform invasive procedures. One suspects that fact finders actually look to
see whether a patient could reasonably regard the risk as material, without the fact finder
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The legal standard regarding what must be disclosed by the physician
to the patient varies among the states. 57 Generally, the states have
physician" standard and the
applied two standards, the "reasonable
"reasonable patient" standard. 8
Under the former standard, the
physician must disclose what a reasonable physician would disclose,59
while under the latter standard, the physician must disclose what a
reasonable patient would deem significant in deciding whether to
undergo the proposed treatment.6" Under either approach, the physician
does not need to disclose risks that are obvious, commonly known,
known to the patient, not reasonably foreseeable, or not of such a
serious probability that a reasonable patient's decision would be
affected. 6' The former view generally has been characterized as the
majority view in the United States, but a substantial number of states
have followed the latter view.62 The application of the latter standard
to HIV-infected surgeons is the subject of this Article.63

necessarily believing that the patient's view is the only reasonable way to regard the risk. Thus,
a risk of death of 1 in 100,000 cases may be material to one reasonable patient and not to another,
even if the patients are similarly situated in terms of the state of their health. If some might
reasonably regard the risk as material, disclosure should be required, even if all would not agree.
In sum, perhaps the test for disclosure ought to be whether a reasonable person may regard a risk
as material, rather than whether all reasonable persons must so regard the risk. The burden on the
physician likely would not be affected because the physician is already likely to disclose risks that
a reasonable person might regard as material.
57. Schuck, supra note 51, at 916.
58. Id.
59. See. e.g., Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 112 (Wyo. 1989).
60. See. e.g., Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 411 (La. 1988).
61. Id. at 413. Furthermore, the physician need not disclose information that would normally
be required when there is an emergency that renders the patient incapable of giving consent, when
the threat of harm is imminent and outweighs the risk of the proposed treatment, when disclosure
would be medically contraindicated because of danger of the patient becoming ill or too
emotionally distraught, thereby hindering or complicating the treatment, or when such disclosure
would likely cause the patient psychological harm. Id. at 412-13. The discussion in this Article
is premised on circumstances that do not involve emergency or medically contraindicated
exceptions.
62. See Schuck, supra note 51, at 916. Dorothea Beane recently characterized the patientcentered approach as now the majority approach. Beane, supra note 3, at 662-63 n.178 (citing
opinions from 22 jurisdictions adopting a patient-centered approach).
63. The two standards often give the same result, but they are not equivalent. A reasonable
layperson may regard a risk as material while a reasonable physician may not. Cf. Leyson v.
Steuermann, 705 P.2d 37, 45 n.4 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) ("The mere fact that the reasonable and
competent physician does not expect the occurrence of an improbable risk should not negate this
duty of disclosure."); Hamish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Mass. 1982)
("Every competent adult has a right 'to forego treatment, or even cure, if it entails what for him
are intolerable consequences or risks however unwise his sense of values may be in the eyes of
the medical profession."') (quoting Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (R.I. 1972). The
materiality of a risk to a reasonable physician ordinarily must be proved by expert testimony.
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In addition to the two variations regarding the legal standard of
disclosure, the states also vary on the precise types of information that
must be disclosed. Some states require only disclosure of material risks
while some states require disclosure of specific types of risks. Other
states also require disclosures regarding alternative treatments and
prognosis if treatment is declined.64 Common to most of the disclosure
requirements, however, is the duty to disclose significant or "material"
risks.65
The concept of materiality is at the heart of the debate over disclosure of HIV infection by surgeons to patients. In the leading case of
Canterbury v. Spence,66 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit adopted a patient-centered approach and
recognized that a risk is material "'when a reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would
be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding
whether or not to forego the proposed therapy."' 67 The Supreme Court
of Louisiana, relying on Canterbury, observed in Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher6 8 that "[t]he factors contributing significance to a medical
risk are the incidence of injury and the degree of the harm threatened.
If the harm threatened is great, the risk may be significant even though
the statistical possibility of its taking effect is very small." 69 As noted
by the Canterbury court, however, "There is no bright line separating
the significant from the insignificant .... Whenever nondisclosure of

Roybal, 778 P.2d at 112. The jury, however, is competent to determine what is material to a
reasonable patient without the aid of expert testimony. See infra text accompanying notes 115-17.
Lieberman and Derse have suggested that in cases such as those involving HIV infection, the
"reasonable physician" standard may not be appropriate. Lieberman & Derse, supra note 3, at
344. The normal assumption upon which that standard is based-that the physician is acting in
the patient's best interest-is likely to be distorted. Id. A decision not to disclose is probably
based on the physician's personal interests rather than the patient's welfare. Id. In contrast,
Dorothea Beane argues that the patient approach may not be appropriate to determine when
disclosure should be required of HIV-infected surgeons because, as a practical matter, the approach
allows hysteria to be the basis of the disclosure requirement. Beane, supra note 3,at 663-64.
64. Schuck, supra note 51, at 916-17.
65. Id.at 917.
66. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
67. Id. at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)). In Canterbury. the court remanded the case to
allow the jury to consider, among other matters, whether an approximately 1% risk of paralysis
from a surgical laminectomy would be considered a material risk that the surgeon should have
disclosed. Id. at 794.
68. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
69. Id. at 412.
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particular risk information is open to debate
by reasonable-minded men,
70
the issue is for the finder of the facts.,
Some commentators believe that the risk posed by HIV-infected
surgeons is so minimal that it is not material to a reasonable patient.7'
Others, however, believe that the risk is material or that the issue at
least is a matter for the fact finder. 72 The discussion that follows will
examine these opposing positions.
IV. THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH HIV-INFECTED SURGEONS

Any discussion of whether a surgeon should disclose his HIV-positive
status as a part of the process of obtaining a patient's informed consent
must include an examination of the kinds of risks involved. The nature
of these risks and their possible materiality lie at the heart of the
controversy over any disclosure requirement. This Article assumes that
the risks discussed are present, even when the infected surgeon
exercises the reasonable care expected of a medical professional. Even
a careful, nonnegligent surgeon may sustain an injury that poses risk to
the patient. Of course, in the event that the transmission or exposure
results from a surgeon's negligence, the proper basis of liability is
negligent performance of the procedure, not negligent or intentional
failure to disclose.
A. The Risk of Transmission
Transmission of HIV from a surgeon or other health care worker to
a patient may occur during an invasive procedure in the event of bloodto-blood contact. Such contact could occur if the surgeon bleeds into
the patient's surgical wound after the surgeon suffers a skin puncture or
cut (a percutaneous injury) while using a sharp instrument, such as a
needle or scalpel, or as result of contacting a bone fragment. " A risk
of infection exists once the blood-to-blood contact is made. Studies
show that surgeons knick or cut their gloves in about one out of four
surgeries and that percutaneous injuries occur in 1.8 per 100 to 2.5 per
100 operative procedures. 74 Even with the widespread use of universal

70,
71.

464 F.2d at 788.
See infra text accompanying notes 198-200.

72. E.g., Lieberman & Derse, supra note 3, at 350.
73. Larry Gostin, The HIV-Infected Health Care Professional: Public Policy, Discrimination,
and Patient Safety, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 663, 664 (1991).
74, Panlilio et al., supra note 6, at 21. One study found that percutaneous injuries to surgical

personnel occurred in about 6.9% of procedures studied. Jerome I. Tokars et al., Percutaneous
Injuries During Surgical Procedures, 267 JAMA 2899, 2899 (1992).
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precautions,75 surgeons continue to experience frequent
percutaneous injuries.7 6 A study of one HIV-infected surgeon shows
that he sustained a percutaneous injury during a procedure about once
every three weeks, with more substantial bone spicule cuts about once
every month."
The percutaneous injury presents the greatest risk of HIV transmission to a patient (as well as to the surgeon) in surgery; universal
precaution barriers cannot generally prevent this type of injury.78
Fortunately, profuse bleeding is rare even when injury occurs to a
surgeon during surgery, 79 but major injuries do occur occasionally."0
When a cut or puncture occurs, bleeding does not begin immediately. 8
Thus, the standard protocol is to interrupt the procedure8 2and reglove to
reduce the risk of contamination of the patient's blood.

75. Universal precautions are precautions used in health care settings to reduce the risk of
transmission of bloodbome pathogens. These precautions include the use of gloves, masks, and
eye wear, procedures for safe disposal of needles and other sharp instruments, and hand washing.
CDC, Update: Universal Precautions for Prevention of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, Hepatitis B Virus, and Other Bloodborne Pathogens in Health-Care Settings, 37 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 377, 377-82 (1988). See also Bloodbome Pathogens, 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1030 (1994). At least for some surgeries in the future it is likely that surgeon-to-patient
exposure can be greatly diminished beyond present practices with the use of robotics in surgery.
See Toni Marshall, Robo Doc in Virtual OR: Surgeons Able to Operate without Scalpel by Using
Robots, Cameras, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at CIO.
76. Panlilio et al., supra note 6, at 21. Studies indicate that the majority of such exposures
are not reported by the injured health care workers. Carol M. Mangione et al., Occupational
Exposure to HIV: Frequency and Rates of Underreporting of Percutaneous and Mucocutaneous
Exposures by Medical Housestaff, 90 AM. J. MED. 85, 88 (1991). See also Suzanne L. Popejoy
& Donald E. Fry, Blood Contact and Exposure in the Operating Room, 172 SURGERY,
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 480, 480 (1991).

77. C. Fordham Von Reyn et al., Absence of HiV Transmission Froni an Infected Orthopedic
Surgeon: A 13-Year Look-Back Study, 269 JAMA 1807, 1809 (1993). The authors of this article
did not indicate that the rate of injury to the subject of the study was unusual.
78. David M. Bell, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission in Health Care Settings:
Risk and Risk Reduction, 91 AM. J. MED. 294S, 297S (Supp. 3B 1991). Some percutaneous
injuries might be preventable by improved techniques and technology. Id. Even if universal
precautions, when observed, do reduce the risk of transmission, observational studies indicate that
there is a high level of noncompliance. See Kenneth R. Courington et al., Universal Precautions
Are Not Universally Followed, 126 ARCHIVES SURGERY 93, 94-96 (1991). Though many practices
involving noncompliance appear to be those which are intended to reduce the risk to a health care
worker (such as failure to wear eye protection to protect against splashes of blood) or are in
nonsurgical settings, see id., observational studies indicate that after a needle stick injury to the
health care worker, the needle is reused on the patient 32% of the time. Von Reyn et al., supra
note 77, at 1810. The effect of OSHA standards for the workplace requiring use of universal
precautions has yet to be demonstrated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1930.
79. Isaacman, supra note 3, at 452.
80. Keyes, supra note 3, at 601.
81. Isaacman, supra note 3, at 452.
82. Id. Moreover, in some circumstances one might expect the use of latex gloves to reduce
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The precise risk of transmission from an HIV-infected health care
worker in procedures involving sharp instruments is not known. No one
doubts, however, that infection can be transmitted during such procedures.83 A number of factors influence the degree of risk in a given
procedure, such as the kind of procedure,84 the length of the procedure,
the number of operators, the skill of the surgeon, the type of injury, the
amount of blood that may enter the patient's open wound, the general
health and immunity of the patient, and the stage of the surgeon's
infection. 5
Estimates of the precise risk of transmission vary widely. Because
no cases of a transmission of HIV by a health care worker to a patient
have been reported, except in the David Acer cases, 6 experts have
derived the estimates using modeling techniques.8 7 The CDC has
estimated that the risk of transmission by a surgeon is in the range of
1 in 42,000 to I in 417,000.8 Others have estimated the risk at I in

the likelihood of bleeding into the patient's wound because the elastic nature of the gloves might
serve to keep the surgeon's wound closed, inhibiting the flow of blood from the cut.
83. See H. Kim Lyerly, Transmissible Agents and the Surgeon, 180 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 91,
92 (1995).
84. Injury rates to physicians are higher in some specialties and procedures than others. See
Panlilio et al., supra note 6, at 21. For example, one study found that obstetricians, gynecologists,
and general surgeons have the highest percutaneous injury rate and orthopedic surgeons have the
lowest rate. Id. One reason that obstetricians and gynecologists may have a higher injury rate is
that procedures such as vaginal hysterectomies and pelvic surgeries involve manipulation of sharp
instruments in the patient's body cavity by feel rather than by sight. Rhame, supra note 23, at
507.
85. See Rhame, supra note 23, at 507. A person with AIDS may have as many as 100 times
the titer of HIV in the blood as one who is HIV-positive but asymptomatic. Panlilio et al., supra
note 6, at 22.
86. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
87. See Bell, supra note 78, at 295S. Indeed, over 22,000 patients have been identified as
having been treated by HIV-positive dentists and surgeons without any evidence of transmission
of HIV to these patients. Lyerly, supra note 83, at 92. Despite these encouraging findings, which
support the conclusion that the likelihood of transmission is low, it is nevertheless possible that
the look-back studies fail to indicate the potential for an HIV-infected surgeon to transmit the virus
to clusters of patients. Richard N. Danila et al., A Look-Back Investigation of Patients of an HIVInfected Physician: Public Health Implications, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1406, 1409 (1991); Ban
Mishu & William Schaffner, HIV-Infected Surgeons and Dentists: Looking Back and Looking
Forward, 269 JAMA 1843, 1843 (1993). The look-back studies have been criticized as flawed
in part because of the small number of HIV-infected health care workers involved and because the
majority of patients of the health care workers involved were not traced. Sanford Kuvin, There
Is No Murder Mystery in the David Acer AIDS Case, PALM BEACH POST, June 24, 1993, at 12A.
88. See also Bell, supra note 78, at 298S. Included in the evaluation is the CDC's estimate
that the probability of contact between a surgeon's blood and a patient's open wound is 32%, and
the probability of transmission in such a case at 0.03% to 0.3%. Joel Neugarten, Note, The
Americans With Disabilities Act: Magic Bullet or Band-Aid for Patients and Health Care Workers
Infected With the Human Immunodeficiency Virus?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1302 (1992). Some
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100,000 to 1 in 1,000,000 per surgery, s9 and I in 28,000 to I in 500,000
per hour of surgery. 9 This risk compares to the risk of mortality
associated with anesthesia of 1 in 10,000, 9 ' the risk of mortality
associated with a first exposure to penicillin of I in 50,000 to I in
100,000,92 and the risk of HIV infection from blood transfusion of
screened blood of I in 225,000 per unit of blood. 93 In 1991, based on
the CDC's calculation of the risk of HIV transmission from surgeons
and dentists, the CDC estimated that during the period from 1980 to
1990 between 12 and 129 patients possibly were infected with HIV
during invasive surgical or dental procedures."
Another factor to be considered in evaluating the risk is the cumulative effect over the remaining working life of an infected surgeon. As

with the risk of transmission to a single patient posed by an HIVinfected surgeon, the lack of empirical data creates uncertainty in any
estimation of the risks. The CDC, however, has estimated that the
probability that an infected surgeon performing 500 surgeries in one
year will transmit the virus is 1.2%, with a range depending on the
surgical specialty of 0.2% to 2.8%. 9' Over an assumed seven-year

subgroups may have risks that are higher than 0.3% and some may have lower risks. Bell, supra
note 78, at 295S. The CDC model used 2.5% as the estimated probability of percutaneous injury.
Neugarten, supra, at 1302. The CDC model has been criticized as overstating the risk. See
Rebecca Voelker, Surgeons Join Opposition to 'Exposure-Prone' List: Group Urges Precautions
Rather Than Restrictions, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 4, 1991, at 4.
89. Rhame, supra note 23, at 507.
90. Albert B. Lowenfels & Gary Wormser, Risk of Transmission of HIV from Surgeon to
Patient, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 888, 889 (1991).
91. Norman Daniels, HIV-Infected Health Care Professionals: Public Threat or Public
Sacrifice, 70 MILBANK Q. 3, 17 (1992).
92. Sheldon H. Landesman, The HIV-Positive Health Professional: Policy Options for
Individuals, Institutions, and States: Public Policy and the Public-Observations From the Front
Line, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 655, 657 (1991). Some have argued that because most
persons would not consider the risk of death significant in receiving the first dose of penicillin,
the risk of HIV-transmission should be treated similarly. Beane, supra note 3, at 645 n.60. The
risks, however, are not comparable if there is no readily available, safer alternative to penicillin.
Reasonableness of the risk is related to the availability, feasibility, and effectiveness of alternative
approaches.
93. R.Y. Dodd, The Risk of Transfusion-Transmitted Infection, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 419,
420 (1992). Comparison of these risks has somewhat limited value in determining the significance
of the risk to a patient because of questions regarding the avoidability of the risk or available
alternatives.
94. Neugarten, supra note 88, at 1303.
95. Lieberman & Derse, supra note 3, at 338. Another commentator has estimated that the
risk in one year is approximately 0.8%, assuming 500 surgeries per year, and 0.08%, assuming 100
surgeries per year (based on an assumed risk of viral transmission by an infected surgeon to a
single patient of I in 130,000). See Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice
of Seriously Invasive Procedures, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 32-33. Authors of
one look-back investigation of possible transmission of HIV by an infected surgeon concluded that

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

work-life expectancy after the surgeon's infection, the probability of
transmission to at least one patient is estimated to be 8.1%, with a range
depending on the surgical specialty of 1.0% to 18.3%.96 Given that a
number of persons may live for ten or more years before showing
clinical evidence of infection,97 the probability estimate for such persons
would be higher.
B. The Risk of Exposure
In addition to the low risk of transmission with its severe consequences, a patient risks having to undergo HIV testing following exposure or
possible exposure to a surgeon's infected blood. This risk is likely to
be much higher than the risk of actual infection or seroconversion. If
the CDC estimates of the probability of percutaneous injury and blood
contact between surgeon and patient are reasonably accurate, then
perhaps 1 in 125 patients undergoing surgery by an HIV-infected
surgeon will be exposed to blood-to-blood contact with the surgeon.9"
Even though the risk of actual transmission is relatively small should
exposure occur, one would be unlikely to consider the risk of infection
once blood has been exchanged in an exposure incident to be insignificant. For example, under Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations, health care employers must provide free
testing and evaluation of health care workers in the event of workrelated exposure to HIV. 99 Likewise, if a patient is exposed to the
blood of a health care worker through a parenteral or mucous membrane contact, the CDC recommends periodic testing for HIV infection.
A hospital or surgeon following the CDC's recommendations is likely
to recommend testing for the patient following an exposure incident.
The consequences of exposure and testing are likely to be significant,
even if the tests are negative. At least one study of exposed health care
workers indicates a high likelihood of severe acute emotional distress
the risk is likely to be less than I per 1000 person-hours of surgical exposure. Audrey S. Rogers
et al., Investigation of Potential HIV Transmission to the Patients of an HIV-lnfected Surgeon, 269
JAMA 1795, 1799 (1993).
96. Lieberman & Derse, supra note 3,at 338.
97. Altman, supra note 31, at Cl.
98. See Neugarten, supra note 88, at 1303. The CDC estimates that the probability of
percutaneous injury to a surgeon during surgery is 2.5% and that the probability that blood-toblood contact may occur between the patient and the surgeon is 32% when a percutaneous injury
occurs. Id. at 1302.
99. Bloodborne Pathogens, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(t) (1994).
100. The CDC recommends testing as soon as possible following exposure and periodically
thereafter at 6 weeks, and at 3, 6, and 12 months. 1985 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2,
at 685-86.
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and suggests that "HIV exposure should be viewed as an emotional
crisis, and [that] counseling and support should be made readily
If health care professionals are likely to experience
available."'' °
significant stress over HIV exposure despite a relatively low probability,
one should reasonably expect a similar response in lay persons.
Accordingly, the probability of post-surgical HIV-testing and the
likelihood of a serious negative impact on the emotional health of
patients should be considered in evaluating the materiality of the risks
posed to a patient by an HIV-infected surgeon. 1" 2
C. Associated Risks
Although not directly related to the risk of HIV infection in surgery,
several commentators have raised the issue of the effect of neurological
complications associated with HIV. 1"3 The incidence of neurological
damage is increasing among those with HIV infection.'04 HIV can
directly attack the brain and the central nervous system, thereby causing
a number of neurological conditions such as toxoplasmosis, primary

101. Keith Henry & Joseph Thum, HIV Infection in Heathcare Workers: How Great Is the
Risk? What Can Be Done Before and After Exposure?, 89 POSTGRADUATE MED. 30, 34 (1991).
In this study, despite an estimated risk of only 0.03% to 0.3% of seroconversion, 55% of the
workers who had significant exposure to HIV, but no seroconversion, experienced severe acute
distress; 35% had persistent moderate stress; 25% reported significant impact on their sexual
relations; and 30% left their jobs. See id.The study was of a small sample, only 20 persons. Id.
Nevertheless, the study is likely to be at least broadly representative of the emotional responses
of persons to HIV exposure.
102. This problem is made more difficult because of the lack of routine reporting of
percutaneous injuries by health care workers. See Mangione, supra note 76, at 85. There is, at
least in many hospitals, no routine record-keeping of percutaneous injuries by which possible
exposures could be identified. While this lack of reporting does not directly affect the risk of
exposure, better reporting would help in quantifying the actual or probable blood-to-blood
exposure rate in surgeries and would allow better evaluation of the risks of exposure. Lack of
complete and accurate exposure records may make it easier for courts to find that proof of actual
exposure is unnecessary for recovery because typically the patient has no records to prove
exposure during surgery. For example, in Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 336-37 (Md. 1993),
the court did not require actual proof of exposure because the plaintiff had no ability to prove such
exposure. If such records were routinely kept, however, defendants might more successfully argue
that actual exposure should be required for recovery in cases involving fear of AIDS resulting
from exposure during surgery. Routinely kept records would document exposure incidents and
perhaps remove a court's concern regarding the patient's inability to prove exposure because the
patient would have access to information.
103. See, e.g., Isaacman, supra note 3, at 457-59; Dorsett D. Smith, Physicians and the
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 264 JAMA 452, 452 (1990) (noting the risk of transmission
of other infectious diseases associated with a suppressed immune system by an HIV-infected
surgeon); James S. Fulghum, A Surgeon With AIDS, 264 JAMA 3147, 3147 (1990).
104. Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Drugs Fail to Curb Dementia and Nerve Damage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. I,1994, at C3.
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lymphoma of the brain, progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy,
neuropathy, and dementia.' 5 In particular, dementia is not easy to
diagnose and is easily overlooked. 16 Obviously, the concern is that
dementia or other HIV-induced neurological conditions may affect an
HIV-infected surgeon's judgment or motor skills before the surgeon's
supervisors notice a problem and remove the surgeon from practice. 07
V. THE REGULATORY

RESPONSE

The real, though admittedly small, risk of transmission of HIV in a
surgical setting has generated much discussion and debate over the
duties of surgeons with respect to their patients.' °
As noted in the

introduction, the debate implicates matters of individual autonomy of
patients; privacy rights, economic interests, and ethical duties of
infected surgeons; and public health policies. Attempts to balance these
conflicting concerns have led medical and legal commentators,
professional medical associations, the CDC, state regulators, state
legislatures, and advocacy groups to adopt a variety of positions. 0 9
Essentially four primary positions have been advanced. These may be
summarized as follows:
(1) Because the risk to individual patients is very low, HIV-infected

surgeons and other health care workers should not be subject to any
practice restrictions. Similarly, they do not owe any duty to disclose
their HIV status to patients. Instead, they should be subject to the same

infection control standards and competency standards as are applied to
health care workers generally."'

105.
106.

Id.
Id.; see also Isaacman, supra note 3, at 458-59.

107.

Altman, supra note 104, at C3.

108.

See supra note 3.

109. Each state is required to adopt the guidelines of the CDC or equivalent guidelines
regarding the prevention of transmission of HIV and the Hepatitis B virus "during exposure prone
invasive procedures" in order to receive federal public health funds. Treasury, Postal Service, and
General Government Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876.

Several articles and student comments have described the congressional and state legislative
responses. See, e.g., Beane, supra note 3, at 648-54; Nodzenski, supra note 3, at 331-34.
110. Barnes et al., supra note 3, at 324; Eisenstat, supra note 3, at 333; Leonard H. Glantz,
et al., Risky Business: Setting Public Health Policy for HIV-Infected Health Care Professionals,
70 MILBANK Q. 43, 76 (1992); Ban on Practice Restrictions for HIV-Infected Physicians
Recommended by National Commission on AIDS in July 30 Report, HEALTH NEWS DAILY, July
31, 1992, at 5; HI V-Infected Physicians Should Not Be Restricted in Surgical Practices, AmFAR
Testifies at CDC Meeting, HEALTH NEWS DAILY, Feb. 25, 1991, at 4; Benjamin Schatz & Alvin

Novick, AIDS: Restrictions We Don't Need, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1991, at A17. This is also the
position of the New York State Health Department. See Sari Staver, New York: Infected Health
Workers Don't Have to Tell Patients, AM. MED. NEWS, June 15, 1992, at 6. Massachusetts has
a similar policy. See Dolores Kong, Mass. Offers AIDS Rules for Health Workers, BOSTON
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(2) HIV-infected surgeons should not perform seriously invasive
procedures that pose a significant risk. Otherwise, however, no
restrictions should be imposed solely on the basis of infection status.'
(3) HIV-infected surgeons should be aware of their infection status,
should perform exposure-prone invasive procedures only after consultation with and approval by an expert review panel (which will make
recommendations about any necessary practice restrictions), and should
make disclosure of their HIV status 2to their patients after approval of
the procedures by the expert panel."

GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1992, at 33.
111. Larry Gostin, The HIV-Infected Health Care Professional: Public Policy, Discrimination.

and Patient Safety, 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 303, 306, 308 (1990) (arguing that restrictions
are justified, not because the risk to any single patient compels such restrictions, but because the
cumulative risk is within a range which would justify such restrictions); Rhame, supra note 23,
at 508 (stating the policy of the University of Minnesota Hospital, which requires HIV-infected
surgeons to avoid surgery involving blind manipulation of sharp instruments by feel, but does not
limit other types of surgery because the risk of transmission does not warrant such restrictions).
No states or federal agencies have adopted this position by statute or regulation. In the United
Kingdom, however, the Department of Health requires infected health care workers to cease
involvement in invasive procedures. A. Graham Bird & Sheila M. Gore, Revised Guidelines for
HIV Infected Health Care Workers: We Need Data Not Dogma, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 1013. 1013
(1993).
Gostin argues that the CDC should develop a uniform standard regarding which procedures
present unacceptable risks of exposure to patients. Gostin, supra, at 308. The CDC distinguished
between invasive procedures generally, which included procedures from insertion of intravenous
needles to most types of surgery, and "exposure-prone" procedures, which included greater risks
of percutaneous injuries to a surgeon, when the CDC issued its 1991 recommendations for
preventing transmission of HIV and Hepatitis B during exposure-prone procedures. 1991 CDC
Recommendations, supra note 7, at 4. The CDC did not classify specific procedures as exposureprone, but did give ageneral definition of the term: "Characteristics of exposure-prone procedures
include digital palpation of a needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the
[health care worker's] fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or object in a poorly

visualized or highly confined anatomic site." Id. at 4. The CDC sought the cooperation of
medical associations to identify specific procedures to classify as exposure-prone. See Sari Stayer,
CDC Opts to Let States Handle HI V-Infected Health Workers, AM. MED. NEWS, June 29, 1992,
at I. However, no standard list of exposure-prone procedures was developed; nor is there any

ongoing official effort to do so. See id. In 1992 the CDC abandoned the effort to develop such
a list. See id. The current policy of the CDC is to allow states to develop their own policies in

defining "exposure-prone" procedures. Id. AIDS activist groups are pressuring the CDC to revise
the 1991 guidelines to reduce support for what they perceive to be public hysteria over HIVinfected health care workers. See Lawsuits Blamed on 'Unsound' Policy for HIV-Positive Health
Care Workers, AIDS ALERT, Mar. 1994, at 33 [hereinafter Lawsuits Blamed]. Some commentators
have called for restrictions on all invasive procedures in the United States. Keyes, supra note 3,
at 605; Sanford F. Kuvin, Doctors With HIV Do Pose a Risk, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 3,
1991, at C5. In the United Kingdom, the Royal College of Surgeons has a policy stating that HIVinfected surgeons should not perform invasive procedures. Lynn M. Peterson, The Impact of HIV

on Surgical Practice, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 450, 450 (1993) (book review).
112. This is the current approach of the CDC. 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note II.
at 5. See also'David Orentlicher, HIV-Infected Surgeons: Behringer v. Medical Center, 266
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(4) HIV-infected surgeons should be aware of their infection status,
notify the appropriate authority (such as the state department of health),
and perform exposure-prone invasive procedures only in compliance
with expert review panel recommendations after consultation and
Such surgeons, however, are not required to disclose
approval.
infection to patients prior to surgery. 113
VI. THE APPLICATION OF THE INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE TO
THE HIV-INFECTED SURGEON
Despite the adoption of a variety of regulations and statutes regarding
HIV-infected health care workers, none of these statutes or regulations
appear to control completely the issue of informed consent and
disclosure, particularly in jurisdictions that use a patient-centered
The statutes and regulations are primarily directed at
standard.
regulating competence to practice, rather than disclosure requirements
for informed consent. "4 The statutes do not necessarily set a standard
JAMA 1134, 1136 (1991) (summarizing the American Medical Association (AMA) position).
More recently, a spokesman for the AMA has affirmed this position. Lawsuits Blamed, supra note
Ill, at 33.. Texas has statutorily adopted this approach. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
85.204 (West 1992). Arkansas has adopted this approach by regulatory means. LeBlang, supra
note 3, at 328. Maryland also requires disclosure. Karla Dauler, New Policy on AIDS for Health
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at 13NJ-6. See also Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md.
1993) (finding that the plaintiffs stated a claim in alleging injury from a surgeon's failure to
disclose his HIV-intection prior to surgery) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 267-82).
Missouri and New Hampshire have adopted statutes with modified versions of this approach,
leaving a review panel the authority to determine whether disclosure of HIV infection should be
made by the surgeon prior to the type of proposed procedure. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.700 (Vernon
Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-F:9-b (Supp. 1994).
113. This appears to be the position that most states have adopted, either by statute or by
administrative regulation. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-11 A-63 (Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §
139C.2 (West Supp. 1994); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, §§ 693.30-.40 (1992); N.C. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 15A, r. 19A.0207 (June 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.2 (West Supp. 1995). See
also Dauler, supra note 112 (indicating that at least 28 states have established expert review panels
but do not require disclosure to patients in obtaining informed consent). The primary difference
between the second approach and the fourth approach is that under the latter there is no uniform
ban on exposure-prone procedures as such. Instead, the fourth approach appears to use a case-bycase approach. This approach would appear to be a compromise position, providing for some
mandatory monitoring. Such an approach is opposed by those advocating the first position and
those who advocate a stronger approach on restrictions. The third position also appears to be a
compromise, but that position is more stringent on disclosure than the fourth approach.
114. Statutes or regulations that require disclosure to patients under some circumstances are
not necessarily dispositive of whether the informed consent doctrine, whether in common law or
statutory form, requires disclosure. For example, in states where the regulations or statutes
governing the practice of HIV-infected surgeons are silent on the duty to disclose, the courts must
decide whether, and under what circumstances, the doctrine of informed consent requires
disclosure. In states providing for review panels that may require disclosure for exposure-prone
procedures, it is not clear that the panel decision is necessarily dispositive as to the duty to disclose
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for disclosure or establish the materiality of the risk as a matter of law.
One might expect that the regulations and statutes, as well as the policy
positions of professional medical associations, should have some
evidentiary value regarding the professional standard of care in claims
of malpractice. Nevertheless, in cases involving the duty to disclose,
the jury must decide the issue of materiality of the nondisclosed risk to
a reasonable patient.' 5 Although expert testimony may be necessary to

even if the panel concludes the procedure is not exposure-prone. Further legislation may be
necessary in such states to clarify this issue.
115. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972). Courts in at least six statts, however, have held that in order to recover for damages
arising from a fear of AIDS, the plaintiff must prove actual transmission of HIV. Under this
approach, the plaintiff in a claim for failure to obtain informed consent must prove actual infection
before the jury may reach the issue of the duty to disclose. See McKnight v. American Red Cross,
No. Civ. A. 92-4038, 1994 WL 323861, at *4, (E.D. Pa. July 6, 1994) (applying Pennsylvania
law); J.B. v. Bohonovsky, 835 F. Supp. 796, 800 (D. N.J. 1993) (applying New Jersey law); Burk
v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law); Kerins
v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Herbert v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 711 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Lopez v. Leal, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 832, 839 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994), review granted, 877 P.2d 762 (Cal. 1994), and review dismissed, 888 P.2d 235 (Cal.
1995); Barrett v. Danbury Hosp., No. 310046, 1994 WL 76394, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 3,
1994); Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (111.
App. Ct. 1994); Petri v. Bank
of N.Y. Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr.,
623 A.2d 3, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). In these states, at least where the highest court has ruled, the
issue of disclosure, even in the case of an actual exposure occurrence, seems to be effectively moot
until an actual case of transmission occurs. A surgeon with HIV in one of these states may be less
likely to disclose an HIV-positive status because weighing a low probability of actual transmission
and a low probability of liability for exposure against the personal costs of disclosure, likely will
result against disclosure. This result is especially likely in light of the lack of consensus on the
issue of whether such disclosure is ethically required. One could still argue, however, that the
surgeon should bear the expenses and losses in connection with post-surgical HIV testing should
an exposure event occur. Where expert testimony shows that the monitoring is reasonable under
the circumstances, medical monitoring expenses have been permitted as an item of recovery in
toxic exposure cases, even when fear of a future illness, such as cancer, is barred as an item of
recovery because it is not likely the illness will occur. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863
P.2d 795, 811, 822 (Cal. 1993). Whether plaintiffs are likely to pursue a claim if test expenses
are the only item of allowable recovery is doubtful. In the event of transmission, however, the
patient should be able to demonstrate rather easily that a different decision would have been made
had there been disclosure. See Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS:
The -Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 33
(1989).
In contrast, the following cases stand for the proposition that a plaintiff is entitled to recover
on a claim for fear of AIDS upon proof of a defendant's fault and actual exposure to HIV without
requiring proof of probability of development of AIDS in the future. These cases generally limit
damages to the time between discovery of exposure and negative test results or a reasonable time
within which such results could be obtained following discovery. See Cotita v. Pharma-Plast,
U.S.A.. Inc., 974 F.2d 598, 601-02 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Louisiana law and allowing a nurse
recovery after a needlestick injury with an HIV-contaminated needle although he tested negative,
but failing to discuss the lack of evidence of any development of future AIDS); Marriott v. Sedco
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Forex Int'l Resources, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59, 72 (D. Mass. 1993) (applying the Jones Act and
maritime law to a seaman's claim arising out of exposure to HIV through a contaminated vaccine);
Brzoska v. Olsen, 1995 WL 558413, at *6 (Del. Sept. 8, 1995) (finding no claim by patients
against an HIV-infected dentist absent proof of actual exposure); Vallery v. Southern Baptist
Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861, 869 (La. Ct. App. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 860 (La. 1994) (finding
a sufficient channel of exposure to permit a wife to state a claim when the bleeding of an unruly
HIV-infected patient on the hand of the wife's husband and a security guard was followed by
unprotected sex between husband and wife, with no warning by hospital employer of the husband's
risk of infection); De Milio v. Schrager, 666 A.2d 627, 629 (N.J. Super. 1995) (refusing to dismiss
a defendant's motion for summary judgment for a claim for fear of AIDS by a trash collector
injured by improperly discarded dental instrument upon a showing that the defendant acted
recklessly in discarding the instrument, creating a rebuttable presumption of actual exposure, but
finding that absent such reckless or intentional conduct by the defendant, there is no claim for fear
of AIDS unless the plaintiff shows actual exposure through a "scientifically acknowledged channel
of transmission"); Brown v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769-70
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (denying a defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to submit to a blood
test when the plaintiff claimed fear of AIDS following puncture with an HIV-contaminated
needle); Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that a
plaintiff stated a claim based on unprotected sex with a boyfriend who knew or should have known
of his infection); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)
(denying a claim by a surgeon who performed surgery on an HIV-infected patient without
disclosure of the patient's HIV status, absent some allegation of an unusual occurrence during
surgery); Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn. 1993)
(denying recovery when a hospital visitor accidentally pricked his finger on a discarded needle but
offered no proof that the needle contained HIV-infected blood); Johnson v. West Virginia Univ.
Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va. 1991) (allowing recovery when a security guard was bitten
by a HIV-infected patient); Funeral Servs. By Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d
79, 84 (W. Va. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va.
1993) (finding no claim by a mortician against a hospital that released a corpse infected with HIV
to the mortician without disclosing the infection, absent an allegation of actual exposure). In none
of these cases did the courts discuss the specific probability of infection. Courts following this
approach to a claim for fear of AIDS likely will permit recovery in an informed consent case, at
least where the patient-centered approach is used, if the risk is found to be material and actual
exposure to the surgeon's blood occurred.
Other courts have held that a claim could be stated by alleging possible exposure or a channel
of possible exposure, without an allegation of actual exposure. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R.,
31 F.3d 1197, 1204 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995) (allowing recovery under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act for a railroad employee who sustained a needle stick injury,
although there was no proof that the needle was contaminated with HIV); Faya v. Almaraz, 620
A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993) (holding that the plaintiffs properly stated claim for fear of AIDS based
on discovery that their surgeon was HIV-infected and did not disclose his infection prior to
surgery); Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Ctr., No. 15,940, 1995 WL 746624, at *6-7 (N.M.
Ct. App. Oct. 3, 1995) (allowing plaintiff to proceed with a claim for emotional distress on
allegation of exposure incident which included "medically sound method of transmission through
the unhealed paper cuts on her hands which came into contact with the bloody fluid."); Castro v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (allowing a claim where a
cleaning worker pricked her finger on a discarded hypodermic needle in an insurance office, but
failing to discuss the need for the worker to allege that the needle was contaminated); Howard v.
Alexandria Hosp., 429 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1993) (allowing a plaintiff to present evidence on a
claim to recover for physical pain and injury because of testing, including HIV tests, mental
anguish and emotional distress from fear of infectious diseases, including AIDS, and physical pain
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establish the nature and size of the risk," 6 no expert testimony is
required for a fact finder to assess the materiality of the risk. 1 7 When
a patient-centered standard applies, the materiality of a risk is viewed
from the patient's viewpoint, not the physician's." 8 Thus, the physician
must disclose all information, including information about all known
risks presented by the proposed treatment, that a patient would need to
know in order to make an intelligent and informed decision." 9
An examination of the reported cases does not yield a consistent
approach to drawing a line between the risks that reasonable persons
agree are material and those risks that are not material. 2 ° As mentioned
earlier, materiality is a function of the severity of the harm risked and
its probability of occurrence. 121 Consideration also may be given to the
availability of alternative treatments 122 or, in the case of risks presented
by the surgeon's personal characteristics (provider-specific risks), the
availability of other qualified surgeons. 2 3 In examining these factors,
courts have come to a variety of conclusions. One point is apparent:
The matter must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
A. An Examination of Analogous Cases
The cases most analogous to cases involving the risk of transmission
of HIV from infected surgeons to patients are those involving a
surgeon's duty to disclose the risk of HIV infection from blood
transfusion. Courts in a few reported cases have found that the issue of
materiality presented by the nature of the risk of transmission was a
matter for a jury. No reported cases appear to hold that the risk of HIV

and discomfort from post-surgical antibiotic therapy necessitated by negligent use of unsterilized
instruments during surgery, but failing to discuss the need for the plaintiff to allege that the
instruments were actually contaminated); Kaehne v. Schmidt, 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) (allowing recovery for a plaintiff's fear of AIDS following an unscreened blood transfusion,
before plaintiff tested negative for HIV, against a defendant whose negligence caused the injury
that required the transfusion).
116. Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28, 31 (iowa 1991).
117. Arato v. Avedon, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the
weighing of the materiality of risks is not an expert skill and that jurors are the most suitable triers
of fact in determining what information a reasonable person would regard as needed to make an
informed decision regarding treatment).
118. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
119. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d at 31.
120. See Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 403 (La. 1988) (collecting a number
of cases).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
122. Hamish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Mass. 1982).
123. See infra text accompanying notes 159-68.
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transmission by transfusion is or is not material as a matter of law
under all circumstances.
In Valdiviez v. United States,'24 the plaintiff apparently contracted
AIDS following a blood transfusion during surgery.' 25 The plaintiff
made a claim for damages resulting from the failure to disclose the risk
of HIV infection from blood transfusion.' 26 The trial, court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that a "reasonable
jury could not find that the possibility of contracting AIDS from a
blood transfusion was a material risk."' 27 In reversing, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that while the
incidence of HIV-contaminated blood is very low, the severity of the
harm posed is great. 128 Therefore, the court held that "a reasonable
factfinder could find that if fully informed a reasonable person could
have refused to accept a blood transfusion from ' the
29 anonymous donor
and may even have refused to undergo surgery."'
Similarly, in Knight v. Department of the Army, 3 ' the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas followed Valdiviez and
found that the failure to disclose the risk of HIV infection from blood
transfusion could have influenced a reasonable person's decision to
consent to a medical procedure.' 3 '
The court, however, entered

124. 884 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1989).
125. Id. at 197. The court never explicitly stated that the plaintiff actually was HIV-infected
or had AIDS, but this fact is implied.
126. Id. The claim was brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). Id.
127. Id. at 198.
128. Id. at 199.
129. Id. at 200. Further support of the view that the risk of transmission presents a material
risk may be found in the cases determining that IiIV-infected health care workers may present a
significant threat to the safety of patients with respect to the application of antidiscrimination
statutes. See Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 221-26); Doe
v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Washington
Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 632-34 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
130. 757 F. Supp. 790 (W.D. Tex. 1991).
131. Id. at 794. The court found the risk could influence a reasonable patient although the
parties stipulated that the risk of transmission was "minimal-ranging between I in 500,000 and
I in 7,000,000." Id. This risk information was not available to the plaintiff's physicians in 1984,
the time of the surgery, but the possibility of transmission was known. Id. The court also found
that because the patient would not have been a candidate for autologous (self-donated) transfusion,
there was no injury by any failure to disclose the risk of such a procedure. Id. at 795. The risk
of transmission of HIV through blood transfusion from donors is now estimated to be I in 225,000
per unit. Roger Y. Dodd, The Risk of Transfusion-Transmitted Infection, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED.
419, 420 (1992). Transfusion of multiple units would increase the risk for a single patient. See
Paul D. Cummings et al., Exposure of Patients to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Through the
Transfusion of Blood Components That Test Antibody Negative, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 941, 944
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judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff could prove no harm
The court found that no reasonable
caused by the failure to disclose.'
person in serious need of a coronary bypass would have declined the
surgery, even if the risk had been disclosed.'
In Doe v. Johnston,' a patient infected with HIV through a blood
transfusion sued his surgeon for failure to disclose the risk of infection
from transfusion and for failure to disclose the availability of autologous
transfusion.' 3 5 The Supreme Court of Iowa rejected the plaintiff's claim
that the risk of infection should have been treated as material as a
matter of law. 3 6 Instead, the court affirmed the jury verdict for the
defendant and found that the issue of materiality was a matter for the
jury in light of the conflicting evidence on the probability of harm from
blood transfusion. 3
38
In contrast to Doe, in Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,
a case involving nondisclosure of a relatively low risk of death from an
intravenous pyelogram procedure, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed
a directed verdict for the defendant physician. 13' The risk of death from
the procedure was 1 in 100,000 to I in 150,000, but the patient had a
life-threatening disease for which the treatment was given. 4 ° The court
found that no reasonable person under these circumstances would have
regarded the risk of death from the treatment as material. 4 ' Therefore,
the court held that the materiality of the risk was not a matter to be
decided by the jury.'
Pauscher, however, does not stand for the proposition that a
relatively low risk of death is not material in all cases. Rather, the case
illustrates the proposition that materiality is dependent on the circumstances of each case. Thus, where a procedure is purely elective or
where there are reasonable alternatives, such as changing surgeons, a

(1989).
132. Knight, 757 F. Supp. at 794.
133. Id. at 794-95.
134. 476 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 1991).
135. id. at 30.
136. Id. at 31.
137. Id. The defendant's experts testified that the risk of infection in 1985 was I in 100,000
to I in 1,000,000. Id. The plaintiffs experts testified that the risk was much higher. Id. Later
information indicates that during the mid-1980s, before extensive screening, the risk was actually
I in 7400. Bryan D. Garruto & Frances A. Tomes, In the Dark Shadow of AIDS: How Safe Is
the Blood Supply?, N.J. LAW., Apr. 26, 1993, at 19.
138. 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987).
139. ld. at 357.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 362.
142. Id.,
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patient may regard even relatively small chances of death as significant. 143 In contrast, where the procedure is necessary to remedy a lifethreatening condition, a small chance of death posed by the procedure
may not be material, as in Pauscher. Even though the risk of death
presented by an HIV-infected surgeon is relatively small, in most cases
the patient would have an alternative to an infected surgeon. Applying
Valvidiez, Knight, and Doe, a court should permit a jury to decide
whether the risk is material to a patient in such cases. Thus, should the

harm posed by the risk of transmission occur, and a jury find that the
risk was material, nondisclosure will lead to liability.
Although the risk of exposure is higher than the risk of transmission,1 44 no truly analogous cases exist for comparing the impact of
exposure to the disease with the transmission of HIV. Virtually no
other fatal diseases to which patients are likely to be exposed by their
surgeons exist. Generally, if a surgeon has a highly contagious disease,
continuing to perform surgery would be malpractice. 145 A patient
undoubtedly could recover damages for that malpractice in the event
that harm occurred. The issue of informed consent in such cases would
be superfluous. With HIV, however, the risk is small enough that there
is serious disagreement as to the ethics of performing invasive
procedures while infected. 146 Moreover, HIV is unusual because there

143. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
145. Isaacman, supra note 3, at 475-76.
146. There are other viral diseases, such as Hepatitis B (HBV), that can be transmitted in the
course of surgery and that can have serious consequences. The same OSHA regulations and CDC
recommendations that apply to HIV-infected surgeons also apply to HBV-infected surgeons. See
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1930 (1994); 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note 7, at 1, 5. Like
physicians with HIV, physicians with HBV, including surgeons, have been permitted to practice
although infected. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World; Investigating a Medical
Maze: Virus Transmission in Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1994, at C3. There are no reported
opinions dealing with claims against HBV-infected surgeons for failure to disclose HBV-infection,
although occasional incidents do occur where HBV may be transmitted during surgery. See 1991
CDC Recommendations, supra note 7, at 2. In one particularly disturbing occurrence, a heart
surgeon unknowingly transmitted HBV to 18 surgical patients. Altman, supra, at C3. The
transmission occurred even though the surgeon observed universal precautions and no breaches
of the universal barriers were known to have occurred. Id. Studies indicate that the infection rate
following percutaneous exposure to HBV is "as high as 30%," or 100 times the infection rate of
HIV under similar conditions. Courington et al., supra note 78, at 93. HBV can be a serious,
even fatal, illness. Altman, supra, at C3. A number of deaths are reported each year. Id.
Because of the similarity of transmission by blood, many of the same arguments made with regard
to disclosure of HIV-infection can be made with regard to HBV-infection. HBV, however, is
preventable by vaccination, and harm from exposure without transmission is likely to be less
severe. See id.
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is a delay of up to six months following exposure before antibodies can
be detected in the blood of an infected person.47
Comparison has been made between cases involving fear of future
cancer and those involving fear that results from exposure to HIV.'"
Such comparisons, however, do not apply in the context of a duty to
disclose. Cases involving fear of cancer generally involve consideration
of whether the plaintiff has sustained a compensable injury as a result
of exposure to a toxic, potentially cancer-causing substance.' 49 The duty
to disclose exists as long as the risk is material to a reasonable patient,
whether or not the risk materializes in compensable harm. The issue of
compensable harm from a failure to disclose is distinct from the issue
of whether the duty to disclose exists. IS0
B. A Preliminary Conclusion on Materiality
While the chances of seroconversion remain small after the kind of
exposure likely to occur in a surgical setting, the impact of such an
exposure is likely to be severe. If either CDC or OSHA regards the
risk of HIV transmission following an exposure to be of such significance that it recommends repeated, periodic testing, the reasonable
patient likely would conclude that the risk is sufficiently serious to
merit concern. Moreover, the likely consequence of an exposure
incident, assuming that the recommended prompt notification occurs, "'
is a significant disruption of the patient's normal life because of the fear
of the imminence of death, the tortured course of the disease, the fear
of stigma should infection occur, and the disease's impact on the
patient's private and family life, including the alteration of sexual
practices during the testing period. One would expect fear and anxiety
months while the patient is being tested and waiting
for at least several
52
results.1
test
for

147. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 332 (Md. 1993) (taking judicial notice that "at least
95% of HIV carriers will test positive for the virus ... within six months" of transmission).
148. E.g., Lauren J. Camillo, Comment, Adding Fuel to the Fire: Realistic Fears or
Unrealistic Damages in AIDS Phobia Suits?, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 331, 341-62 (1994).
149. E.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 818 (Cal. 1993) (holding that
there could be no recovery for negligently inflicted fear of cancer induced by toxic exposure in
the absence of proof that it was probable that cancer would develop in the future).
150. Whether compensation should be awarded in the event of exposure to HIV without
transmission is beyond the scope of this Article. A number of courts, however, have permitted
claims to go forward based on exposure incidents alone without proof of transmission. See cases
cited supra note 115.
151. See 1985 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 681-86; 1986 CDC Recommendations,
supra note 97, at 221-23.
152. Testing is recommended for HIV antibodies following exposure at 3, 6, 9, and 12 months.
1985 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 685-86. See also Brown v. New York City Health
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Given the consequences of an exposure incident, a purely dispassionate and unemotional response is unlikely and unrealistic. Nevertheless,
under the doctrine of informed consent, consistent with its purpose of
patient autonomy, a patient acting reasonably should have the right to
avoid the unnecessary fear, anxiety, and inconvenience that are likely
to be created by an exposure incident at the hands of a surgeon. Should
the factual circumstances of a case support a jury finding of materiality,
those seeking to show that disclosure is inappropriate because of
inconvenience and injury to the physician's interests should bear the
burden of proof in this debate."5 3
Whether a reasonable patient would regard the risk of HIV transmission as material becomes less significant in the case where the patient
specifically asks about the HIV status of a surgeon. In such an
instance, an HIV-infected surgeon must disclose his infection and the
associated risks. The surgeon knows or should know that the patient
attaches significance to the risk of HIV infection, and very likely, to
consequences of exposure even in the absence of actual transmission. 154
Reliance on the "reasonable patient" is therefore unnecessary in order
to determine the significance that a particular risk or cluster of risks
may have to the patient. The question implies the significance of the
risks to the patient.'
Courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the autonomy
of patients in determining the course of their own health care.' 56 This

& Hosp. Corp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). There is a 95% probability that if
transmission has occurred, it will be detected within six months. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327,
332 (Md. 1993). The serious effects of exposure to HIV in the workplace have been documented.
See supra text accompanying note 101. The risk may not be enough to disqualify a physician in
the opinion of the licensing authorities, but there may be a risk of having to be tested as a result
of possible exposure incidents. In Illinois, for instance, a state statute requires notification of
patients who have been subject to a possible risk of transmission of HIV by a health care provider
in an invasive procedure. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410 § 325, para. 5.5 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
153. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 413 (La. 1988).
154. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The physician is not
required in such circumstances to second-guess the patient. See id. The Canterbury court's
concern that physicians not be required to second-guess the patient's idea of materiality led the
court to adopt a reasonable patient standard for determining the materiality of a risk. Id But
where the patient leaves no doubt as to her personal view of materiality, it is unnecessary to resort
to the hypothetical reasonable patient. See also Arena v. Gingrich, 748 P.2d 547, 548-49 (Or.
1988) (rejecting a surgeon's argument that the court should adopt a reasonable patient standard
even if the surgeon fails to obtain the patient's informed consent as required by state statute).
155. It is foreseeable that patient advocacy groups could advise patients to make specific
inquiry of their surgeons. If the medical profession continues to be reticent about disclosure to
patients, public confidence in the profession's concern for patients' interests may suffer.
156. See, e.g., Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 414 (citing cases holding that the right to make
decisions with respect to medical treatment is protected by federal and state constitutions because
of the right to privacy).
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57
right of autonomy gives rise to the doctrine of informed consent.
Significant surgical procedures involve contact that is as intimate as any
that can occur in a patient's life. Any interest that a physician or
society has in denying to a patient a right to full disclosure must be
sufficiently compelling to justify such a denial.' In light of the serious
effect that transmission and exposure are likely to have on the patient,
the denial of a right to disclosure, if the risk is found to be material,
must be based on very compelling policy.

C. Policy Objections to Disclosure under the Informed Consent
Doctrine
Some commentators have opposed or questioned the application of
the doctrine of informed consent to require the disclosure of risks that
are provider-specific.' 59 Provider-specific risks are those which are
presented by some characteristic of or circumstances affecting the
particular surgeon or physician in the performance of a procedure or
treatment, as opposed to inherent risks that exist regardless of which
surgeon or physician is performing the procedure or treatment. The risk
of exposure to HIV and the risk of transmission of HIV are providerspecific because the risks exist in a procedure only if an infected
surgeon or other infected health care worker participates in the
surgery.160
Opponents of any disclosure requirement argue that courts traditionally have not applied informed consent to require disclosure of
personal characteristics of physicians. 6 ' Instead, courts apply the
doctrine only to matters inherent in the procedure or treatment itself. .62
Though the vast majority of informed consent cases have involved
inherent risks, the language used by the courts in defining materiality
of a risk has not usually been so narrow as to exclude other types of
risks from the doctrine. 63 Indeed, if the constitutional right of privacy

157. Id. at 411.
158. Id. at 415 ("[Elven a burdensome regulation [of the right to make decisions about medical
treatment] may be validated by a sufficiently compelling state interest.").
159. Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy, supra note 3, at 330; Glantz et al., supra note 110, at
69-72; Gostin, supra note 95, at 32-33.
160. Another exaniple of a provider-specific risk is the risk of failure associated with a
particular surgeon based on his experience and success with a particular procedure in comparison
to other surgeons performing the same procedure. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen,
Comparing Medical Providers: A First Look at the New Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L.
REv. 5, 11-13 (1992).
161. Eg., Gostin, supra note 95, at 34.
162. E.g., id.
163. See Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Mass. 1982) (holding
that a physician must make disclosure "in a reasonable manner to a competent adult patient [ofi
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is broad enough to include the right of self-determination with respect
to medical treatment, 164 a distinction based simply on whether the risks
are purely inherent in the procedure or involve provider-specific matters
is inadequate. Although the doctrine of informed consent may have
originated with risks that were inherent in the procedure,'6 5 the inquiry
as to the scope of the doctrine cannot simply stop there. If providerspecific risks would be material to a patient's decision, such information
should be disclosed absent some compelling interest of the state. 166
Twerski and Cohen have questioned the view that only risks inherent
in the treatment and independent of the physician are subject to
disclosure under the informed consent doctrine.'6 7 The distinction
between provider-specific information and risks inherent in the
procedure regardless of the specific provider is not made in the cases.
Instead, the distinction is drawn only from the absence of cases
involving provider-specific risks. The distinction between risks posed
by the physician and those which are inherent in the procedure itself is
artificial and illogical. Risks of both types may well be material in the
reasonable patient's decision-making process. 6 '

sufficient information to enable the patient to make an informed judgment [about] whether to give
or withhold consent to a medical or surgical procedure"); Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 607
(Cal. 1993) (holding that "a physician is under a legal duty to disclose to the patient all material
information-that is, 'information which the physician knows or should know would be regarded
as significant by a reasonable person in the patient's position when deciding to accept or reject a
recommended medical procedure'-needed to make an informed decision regarding a proposed
treatment").
164. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 414 (La. 1988).
165. Glantz et al., supra note 110, at 69-70.
166. Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 415. Of course, those arguing against disclosure are likely to
reply that the state does have a compelling interest in restricting the right to disclosure for the
reasons generally described supra text accompanying note 110.
167. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 160, at 27-28.
168. Id. at 29. The Supreme Court of California has extended the doctrine beyond its
traditional application to include a requirement of disclosure of "personal interests unrelated to the
patient's health," including financial interests which may affect the physician's professional
judgment. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). While the case
has been criticized for its lack of precision and difficulty of application, see, e.g, Bobinski,
Autonomy and Privacy, supra note 3, at 370-74, the case does reflect the willingness of courts to
extend the boundaries of informed consent beyond the inherent risks of a treatment. Another court
also has indicated that personal characteristics may be the subject of disclosure for informed
consent. Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1194, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a
physician failed to obtain informed consent when he did not disclose his chronic alcohol abuse to
his patient prior to surgery). The Hidding court did not discuss causation of the injury, loss of
bowel and bladder control, which occurred as a result of back surgery. The court also affirmed
the trial court's finding that the physician failed to disclose the risk of loss of bowel and bladder
control as a result of the surgery, without discussing whether a reasonable patient would have
submitted to the surgery regardless. See id. at 1194. Contra Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213,
216-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (refusing to extend Pennsylvania's narrow informed consent doctrine
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A more significant ground for opposition to the disclosure of
provider-specific information is based on concern about the difficulty
in drawing a line between personal information that is subject to
disclosure and that which is not. The lack of a clear line gives rise to
concerns about unnecessary impositions on the privacy and economic
interests of the physician. 169 Opponents fear that once courts begin
requiring the disclosure of provider-specific information, all sorts of
private information that might affect performance in some undefined
way will be subject to disclosure. 7 ° For example, under such a
standard, must a surgeon disclose a lack of sleep the previous night,
stress in his personal life, or a recent financial setback? 7'
The difficulty in line-drawing is not a sufficient reason to bar
disclosure of all provider-specific information. Courts, as a matter of
law, are able to draw lines to exclude from disclosure requirements
information that is only tangential to treatment or that does not present
specifically identifiable risks.'72 However, where a provider-specific
risk presents a specifically identifiable risk of harm, such as the risk of
transmission of a particular disease to a patient, the risk is subject to
disclosure under the informed consent doctrine if the risk is material.
The fact that a risk presented is provider-specific does not require a
different approach to disclosure on that basis alone.173
With respect to privacy and economic rights of the physician, the
matter comes down to weighing those, interests against the autonomy
interests of the patient. Disclosure of some information that is providerspecific, such as statistics that compare the success rates of surgeons,
is unlikely to have any serious privacy implications, though it may
affect economic interests.' 74 With respect to the physician's HIV status,
however, privacy concerns are undoubtedly significant. ' In the view
of those opposed to disclosure, public hysteria, not science and reason,

to include personal characteristics of the physician), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 954 (Pa. 1991).
169. E.g., Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy, supra note 3, at 376.
170. E.g., id.
171. Id.
172. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 160, at 29 (suggesting that information about general
background or idiosyncratic data is not likely to be considered outcome determinative information
subject to disclosure requirements).

173. Id.
174. See id. (pointing out that such information may affect patient selection of physicians).
175. The importance of confidentiality in relation to HIV has been at the heart of much of the
controversy surrounding the debate over AIDS. Because of concern for privacy and confidentiality
and in order to prevent the harmful effects of unwarranted prejudice, there has been widespread
enactment of legislation protecting the confidentiality of information pertaining to the HIV status
of individuals. See Burris, supra note 46, at 122 (noting that nearly every state protects
confidentiality of HIV information to some degree).
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drives the public's desire to have disclosure by surgeons. 176 The likely
loss of the surgeon's livelihood and the social impact are, in this view,
too great a price to pay for disclosure of the risk of HIV transmission.
177
Of course, many patients do overestimate the risk of transmission.
Nevertheless, a real risk of transmission and a greater risk of exposure
incidents requiring testing (and the disruption entailed in testing) exist.
While the right to engage in a career of one's choice undoubtedly is
important, that right should not necessarily override the right of the
patient to choose a physician based on material
information, whether the
78
information is of a personal nature or not.

Physicians often have been considered as acting in a fiduciary
capacity with respect to their patients. 79 As indicated by Lieberman
and Derse, the self-interest of the surgeon in protecting his practice and
financial interest may well override his judgment about the seriousness
of the risk. 8 ' While perhaps personal and financial interests remain
unstated factors in determining which risks to disclose, the HIV-infected
surgeon is likely to be under considerably greater pressure from such
factors than an uninfected surgeon. The patient's legitimate interest in
self-determination must come first, absent some compelling interest of
the state.' 8' The patient is presumably in the best position to decide
what risks the patient will face in consenting to a medical procedure.
The fact that some surgeons might lose their ability to practice some
types of procedures because of a patient's choice to avoid certain risks
82
is not sufficient to override the patient's rights on that ground alone. 1
Opponents of disclosure have argued that the cost to the health care
system in losing trained surgeons and the cost of training replacements

176.
177.

Beane, supra note 3, at 663-64.
See Barbara Gerbert et al., Physicians and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: What

Patients Think About Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Medical Practice. 262 JAMA 1969, 1971

(1989).
178. While surgeons may find themselves effectively excluded from some types of invasive
procedures, large numbers of noninvasive medical positions are available. Keyes, supra note 3,
at 605. Moreover, as new surgical technology and techniques become available, the risks likely
will be eliminated in many invasive procedures, thereby eliminating the need for disclosure with
respect to a risk of exposure to or transmission of HIV by the surgeon. See Marshall, supra note

75, at CIO.
179.

See Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy, supra note 3, at 347-56.

180. Lieberman & Derse, supra note 3, at 344.
181. See Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 415 (La. 1988).
182. Patients may enter into contracts such as managed health care programs which may limit
some choices, or the govemment might ultimately place some limits on patient choice in reforming
the national health care system. Absent such restrictions, however, patients are free to select
physicians and surgeons based on any number of personal criteria. Practitioners who are unable
to satisfy sufficiently patient needs and expectations are subject to being forced from the
marketplace.
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is too great in comparison to the questionable benefit to patient
safety.' 83 Moreover, opponents argue that disclosure requirements may
discourage treatment of AIDS patients by physicians desiring to avoid
the risk of exposure and the possible loss of a career which disclosure
would likely entail." 4 The ADA, however, prohibits a refusal to treat
a patient based solely on the patient's HIV infection.'8 5 Recent suits
under this statute are likely to prove effective in discouraging such a
response if ethical constraints requiring treatment are insufficient.' 86 On
the other hand, proponents of restrictions argue that society's need for
any one doctor-patient relationship is low.' 87 Opponents have not yet
shown that large numbers of surgeons will be lost to the health care
system or that the impact of disclosure is likely to be so dramatic that
the cost to the health care system will be so unduly burdensome as to
justify restricting a basic right to self-determination.
Another objection to any disclosure requirement is that such a
requirement amounts to a transfer of the responsibility of determining
the qualification to practice medicine to patients rather than to appropriate licensing authorities.' 88 This transfer effectively allows individual
patients to set public health policy.' 89 Given the perceived danger,
patients are not likely to use surgeons known to be HIV-infected. 9 °
Thus, surgeons who disclose are likely to be forced out of the practice
of invasive medicine, if not forced out of medicine altogether, even if
otherwise deemed by licensing authorities to be qualified to practice.' 9 '

183. David E. Rogers & June E. Osborn, Another Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 325 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 806, 807 (1991); Schatz & Novick, supra note 110, at A17.
184. Rogers & Osborn, supra note 183, at 807.
185. United States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092, 1094-96 (E.D. La. 1994). On the other
hand, patients are under no legal, ethical, or moral duty to submit to the treatment of any particular
physician or surgeon. Patients have no training or ability to prevent harm by a physician. The
patient has no responsibility to protect the surgeon from unintentional infection or to disclose risks
of infection which the patient may pose to the physician. The sick patient does not choose to need
the services of a physician. The surgeon, however, chooses to enter and remain in the profession
with whatever regulations apply. See Keyes, supra note 3, at 605. The obligation of society to
compensate physicians who contract HIV as a result of treating patients, who the physician may
not decline to treat because of overriding social policy, is beyond the scope of this discussion.
186. See Bill Voelker, NO. Dentist Must Accept HIV Patients, NEW ORLEANs TtMESPICAYUNE, March 25, 1995, at Al (referring to settlement of suits against dentists who refused to
treat HIV-infected patients).
187. Keyes, supra note 3, at 605. Great Britain's experience with a much more restrictive
policy with respect to physicians who practice invasive medicine may provide some evidence as
to the actual impact on the practice of HIV-infected physicians.
188. Glantz et al., supra note 110, at 72.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. Id. Some argue, however, that if the risk is significant enough to deserve disclosure, a
physician exposing the patient to such a risk is violating the ethical requirement of physicians to
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Patient reaction to HIV-infected surgeons, then, effectively determines
the qualification to practice.' 92 In a sense, however, patients will always
be the ultimate arbiters of qualification to practice. Patient choice may
force a surgeon from the market because he is unable to satisfy patient
needs and expectations for a variety of reasons, regardless of whether
he meets the licensing requirements.
Some commentators have suggested that while disclosure should not
be required, patients have a right to ask about a surgeon's HIV status,
though not a right to an answer. "' A refusal to answer, however, may
well cause a patient to draw conclusions, which may or may not be
erroneous. If the patient shares with others that the surgeon refused the
inquiry, the result is likely to be the same as if he disclosed without
being asked.' 94 If the surgeon refuses to answer, and the patient elects
to proceed, one could infer that the patient did not truly regard the risk
as significant. If the surgeon lies in denying infection, he is likely to
be liable for any harm caused by the nondisclosure. 9 '
D. Objections to Disclosure Requirements Based on the Americans
with Disabilities Act
Perhaps the most fundamental objection to a state-imposed disclosure
requirement is that it is violation of the ADA. 196 Under this argument,
a violation would occur whether the state statutes or regulations
explicitly require disclosure or whether the issue is allowed to go to the
jury. Such a violation might exist because, in effect, the state requirement of disclosure would unlawfully discriminate against HIV-infected
surgeons by imposing an unjustified requirement based solely on a
disability.'9 7 In other words, according to this argument, states may not
require disclosure of an HIV infection based on the infection alone.
State law may treat infected surgeons differently from non-infected
surgeons with respect to disclosure requirements only if infected

do no harm. See, e.g., Isaacman, supra note 3, at 474.
192. Glantz et al., supra note 110, at 72.
193. Id. at 73.
194. Fear of such a result may have prompted the founder of a dental association of gay
dentists to suggest that HIV-infected dentists should lie when asked by patients if they are infected.
Mireya Navarro, Patients Grilling Health Workers on AIDS, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1991, at BI.
The only effective policy might end up sounding like the Clinton policy on gays in the
military-don't ask and don't tell.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
196. Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy, supra note 3, at 377; see also Glantz et al., supra note
110, at 59-64.
197. Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy, supra note 3, at 320; see also Glantz et al., supra note
110, at 59-64. State law which discriminates based on disability alone violates the ADA. See 42
U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. V 1993).
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surgeons are not otherwise "qualified individual(s) with a disability"
because of the infection.' 9 8 Under this view, the risk of transmission is
too small to warrant any restrictions on the practice of HIV-infected
surgeons based on infection alone. Moreover, under this view, the fear
of contracting AIDS is not a legitimate concern that would require
disclosure if the risk is otherwise insignificant.'99 The argument
presents the possibility of an interesting conflict between the concept of
materiality under a patient-centered doctrine of informed consent and
the ADA's concept of "essential eligibility requirements."200
No court has ruled on whether a disclosure requirement under the law
of informed consent or under statutes or regulations pertaining to HIVinfected physicians is a violation of the ADA. In Scoles v. Mercy
Health Corp.,2"' however, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that a hospital did not violate the
ADA's provisions on employer discrimination2. 2 in requiring an HIVinfected surgeon to disclose his status to surgical patients in obtaining
their consent to surgery as a condition of maintaining his surgical
privileges.2" 3 The plaintiff in the case was an orthopedic surgeon °4
seeking recovery for alleged discrimination in violation of the Rehabili-

198. The ADA provides: "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. State government is a "public entity" as
defined by the ADA. Id. § 12131(1)(A).
199. See Bobinski, Risk and Rationality, supra note 3, at 252-68. This argument is bolstered
by cases dismissing claims based on the fear of contracting AIDS from physicians who have not
disclosed their HIV infection in obtaining informed consent. See cases cited supra note 115.
While Bobinski argues that the fear of AIDS is irrational because the risk is insignificant, the risk
of actual exposure is significant. Once exposure has or is likely to have occurred, the dynamic
changes. The patient likely will be notified and then will have to face some period of time with
great uncertainty and trepidation waiting on test results. Counseling would undoubtedly be
strongly advised during this period. While it is relatively easy to comfort ourselves that the risk
is still relatively small, human emotion is not that easily manipulated. The fear at this stage is not
based primarily on irrational prejudice, but on an understandable fear of a deadly disease, despite
a relatively small risk. Given what may be a significant risk of exposure, it does not seem
unreasonable to allow the patient to decide whether she wishes to encounter that risk.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
201. 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
202. The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating against an applicant for
employment or an employee who is a qualified person with a disability on the basis of the
disability when that person can perform the essential functions of the employment position, with
or without reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112. An employer, however, may
have qualification standards which include a requirement that a person must not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of other persons in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
203. Scales, 887 F. Supp. at 771-72.
204. Id. at 767.
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tation Act of 1973205 and the ADA. The defendants were related health
care corporations which operated two hospitals and provided health care
services through a health care plan.2" 6 The surgeon practiced at the two
hospitals and provided health care services for plan subscribers.2 7 In
July 1991, the surgeon notified the director of surgery at one of the
defendants' hospitals that the surgeon was HIV-positive. °8 Shortly
thereafter, the defendants sought and obtained permission from a state
court under provisions of a Pennsylvania statute to notify the surgeon's
former patients of his HIV status and to make a public disclosure that
a surgeon with HIV had been suspended, without actually naming
him. 2 9 After initially suspending the surgeon's privileges, the defendants reinstated him with the requirement that he disclose his HIV
status prior to performing any invasive procedure.2 1 °
In his complaint, the surgeon alleged that the public could easily
discern his identity, causing him to end his employment with another
health service and to take out a policy of disability insurance. 21" He
further claimed that he no longer received referrals from the defendants
and that he was removed from the defendants' list of physicians for
plan services.212 The court denied the surgeon's motion for summary
judgment. 2 3 The court granted the defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment and dismissed the surgeon's claims on public notice,
notice to his patients, and the imposition of disclosure requirements in
obtaining consent to treatment by surgery patients.21 4
In considering whether the surgeon's infection posed a significant risk
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973215 or a direct threat under the

205. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Act prohibits discrimination against
persons based solely on disability by any program or agency that receives federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any federal executive agency or the
United States Post Office. Id. § 794(a).
206. Scoles, 887 F. Supp. at 766-67.
207. Id. at 767.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 771.
214. Id. at 772.
215. In School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987), the Supreme Court held that before
a federally assisted program could discriminate against an otherwise qualified handicapped person
on the basis of a communicable disease, the person must pose a "significant risk." In determining
whether a significant risk exists, the court must consider "(a) the nature of the risk (how the
disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the
severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease
will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm." Id. at 288 (quoting Brief for the
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ADA, -16 the Scoles court found that the information regarding the actual
risk of transmission of HIV by an infected surgeon is very limited.21 7
Moreover, because the disease is almost always fatal, the requirement
imposed by the hospital was not a violation of the ADA. 21" The court
likewise rejected the surgeon's claim under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, finding that the surgeon was not "otherwise qualified" because of
the risk of fatal harm. 21 9 The court found that the duration of the risk,
the remainder of the surgeon's career in surgery, and the severity of the
the risk significant,
risk--death-were sufficient grounds to consider
220
even though the risk was "exceedingly low."
The case of Bradley v. University. of Texas MD. Anderson Cancer
Center22' also supports the position that disclosure requirements do not
violate the ADA. In Bradley, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that a hospital did not violate the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 when the hospital reassigned an HIV-positive surgical
technician out of surgery to another position.222 The court found that
because the technician handled sharp instruments during the surgery and
his hands were often in or near the surgical wound, he ran the risk of
injury that could lead to his blood contacting a surgical patient. 23
Reasonable accommodations in the surgical procedures could not avoid

American Medical Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 19).
216. Under the ADA, a qualification standard for employment may be used to deny
employment to a person with a disability if the person poses a direct threat to the health and safety
of others in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). In determining whether a direct threat exists,
an objective, factual determination must be made considering four factors: "(I) The duration of
the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential
harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1994).
"The risk can only be considered if it poses a significant risk ... of substantial harm; a speculative
or remote risk is insufficient." Id. None of the courts addressing the issue of risks posed by HIVinfected surgical health care workers under the ADA have yet dealt with the risk of exposure as
distinguished from the risk of transmission.
217. Scoles, 887 F. Supp. at 772.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 771 (citing Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922
(5th Cir. 1993), discussed infra text accompanying notes 221-26); Doe v. Washington Univ., 780
F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (granting summary judgment on a Rehabilitation Act claim in favor
of a dental school which dismissed a dental student because of the risk of transmission to patients
during training); Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1991) (granting judgment in favor of a hospital after a bench trial and dismissing a surgeon's claim
that the hospital violated a state antidiscrimination statute by restricting his surgical privileges
based on his disability of HIV infection).
220. Scoles, 887 F. Supp. at 769.
221. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993).
222. Id.at 925.
223. Id. at 924.
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the risk.224 The court noted that although the risk of transmission was
small, the consequence of transmission was death. Therefore, the Act
did not protect the technician from reassignment.2 " Thus, Bradley
supports limiting the application of the ADA with respect to disclosure
requirements because infected surgeons do not meet the "essential
eligibility requirements" 226 to practice at least some procedures without
restriction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Doe v.
University of Maryland Medical System Corp.227 similarly refused to
find discrimination under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
when a university hospital decided to suspend an HIV-infected
neurosurgical resident from surgical practice. 2
When the hospital
learned of his infection, the hospital suspended the resident's surgical
practice pending a review by its panel of experts on blood-borne
pathogens. 229 The panel recommended that the resident be permitted to
resume surgical practice except for certain procedures involving the use
of exposed wire, which were considered to present too much risk to
patients.2 3' The panel also recommended other restrictions, including
rigorous observance of infection control procedures.2 1' The panel did
not, however, recommend disclosure to patients in obtaining informed
consent to surgery.2 32
Despite the recommendations of the expert panel, the hospital's
senior administrators refused to allow the resident to return to surgical
practice.23 3 Instead, the hospital offered him alternative residencies in
non-surgical fields.234 When the resident refused the alternative
residencies and demanded reinstatement with surgical privileges, the
hospital terminated him from the residency program. 235
After reviewing the hospital's consideration of the available data from
the CDC and other sources, the court stated that it was reluctant to

224.

Id. at 925.

225.

Id. at 924-25.

226.

Under the ADA, a "qualified individual with a disability" is an "individual with a

disability who . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the

participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
227. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
228. Id. at 1262.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.at 1263.
235. Id.

1996]

WHEN THE SURGEON HAS

HIV

substitute its own judgment for that of the hospital.23 6 The hospital
determined that most, if not all, of the surgical procedures performed by
the resident would fit within the CDC's definition of exposure-prone
procedures.237 Thus, the resident should not perform them. 238 The court
then held that the resident posed "a significant risk to the health and
safety of his patients. ' The court noted that although no cases have
been reported of surgeon-to-patient transmission of HIV, the possibility
still exists. 24 Moreover, reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate
the risk of percutaneous injury. 24 ' Accordingly, the court found that the
resident was not otherwise qualified under the antidiscrimination
statutes.242
As demonstrated by Bradley and Doe, because the courts have treated
the risk of transmission as significant, they are reluctant to apply the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to prevent restrictions on
medical personnel where there is some risk of transmission.24 3

236. Id. at 1266.
237. Id. at 1264.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1266.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. As demonstrated in Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., courts are uncomfortable
in substituting their judgments for the judgments of health care authorities, including hospital
officials with respect to the risk of contagion. See Barry Sullivan, When the Environment is Other
People: An Essay on Science, Culture, and the Authoritative Allocation of Values, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 597 (1994) (discussing the difficulties that courts have in applying the "significant
risk" test in contagious disease cases). Sullivan contends that the courts in cases such as Bradley
have applied a lesser risk test than the "significant risk" test. Id. at 639-43. See also Scott Burris,
Public Health, "AIDS Exceptionalism" and the Law, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 251, 268 (1994)
(calling the risk assessment in Bradley "aggressively simpleminded"). The criticism by Burris is
based on his view that the risk of transmission is so low that it cannot be seen as significant under
the antidiscrimination statutes. The courts, in his view, essentially have adopted a zero tolerance
approach rather than a significant risk approach required under Arline (applying the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973) and the ADA's direct threat approach (which is essentially the same as the Arline
approach). Id. at 269. What Burris ignores is the significant likelihood of actual exposure,
subsequent testing, and possible serious emotional distress which patients ought to be able to
avoid. To focus only on the risk of transmission is to omit a significant matter in the minds of
patients. The wish to avoid such exposure is not simply a result of a hysterical, irrational,
reflexive response. To the extent that Bradley and Scoles could be read as a complete bar on
invasive procedures, perhaps the cases overreach. The fact that some surgeons will be excluded
in practical effect from surgical practice because of rational patient choice, however, is not
something that the antidiscrimination laws are intended to address. While Burris considers patient
choice to avoid the risk of transmission to be irrational and hysterical, Larry Gostin, who does not
favor disclosure, nevertheless recognizes that a reasonably prudent patient would consider the risk
of HIV transmission in a seriously invasive procedure to be material-the harm posed is severe,
even though the risk is low. Gostin, supra note I 11, at 304-05; Gostin, supra note 95, at 33-34.
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Moreover, in light of a post-ADA federal statute that mandates state
adoption of the CDC guidelines or their equivalent,244 a disclosure
requirement that does not go beyond the CDC's guidelines would be
unlikely to violate federal law.245 Thus, if a state were to mandate
disclosure or were to allow a jury to decide the materiality of the risk
in evaluating an informed consent claim, as long as the disclosure
requirements were not more onerous than the CDC guidelines contemplated by Congress requiring disclosure for exposure-prone proce246
such requirements would not appear to conflict with federal
dures,
24 7
law.

On the basis of cases decided thus far, state laws pertaining to
informed consent do not appear to conflict seriously with federal
antidiscrimination statutes as applied by the courts. Should the federal
courts ultimately decide that HIV-infected surgeons do not pose a
significant risk or direct threat to patients in exposure-prone surgeries,
however, the validity of state law, to the extent that it requires
disclosure by such surgeons, would be in serious doubt.
E. Other Cases Involving HIV-Infected Surgeons and the Doctrine of
Informed Consent
Several cases thus far, in addition to Scoles, have raised the issue of
whether HIV-infected surgeons should disclose their infection to
patients. The first case to discuss the issue was Estate of Behringer v.
Medical Center at Princeton.248 In that case, the plaintiff was a surgeon
who learned that he was HIV-infected and had AIDS.249 Others at the
hospital where he worked and was diagnosed soon learned of the
diagnosis.25 ° The hospital canceled his pending surgeries and one year
later issued a policy prohibiting HIV-infected physicians and health care
workers from performing any invasive procedure that posed any risk of

244. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876-77 (1991).
245. In School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987), the Supreme Court indicated that
courts should give deference to recommendations of public health authorities in evaluating the
significance of the risk.
246. See supra note II1 (defining exposure-prone procedures).
247. The state guidelines, however, must be consistent with federal law. Thus, the statute
requiring the adoption of guidelines by the states arguably does not preempt the disability
discrimination statutes. See Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876-77 (1991); Bobinski,
Risk and Rationality, supra note 3, at 230, 231 n.73. In any event, a strong argument can be made
that if disclosure is required with respect to HIV infection in cases where an exposure-prone
procedure is not involved, there may be a violation of the ADA.
248. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
249. Id. at 1254-55.
250. Id. at 1255-56.
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transmission to patients." s ' The hospital also established a policy that
required an HIV-infected physician to disclose his infection in obtaining
informed consent for surgery.2" 2 Following its new policy, the hospital
suspended the surgeon's surgical privileges.253 The surgeon sued,
seeking damages for breach of confidentiality regarding his diagnosis
and for violation of a New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination.254
The surgeon based his discrimination claim on the suspension and
termination of his surgical privileges and the informed consent
requirement imposed on him. 2"
The Superior Court of New Jersey seemed to adopt a zero tolerance
approach in holding that the hospital did not unlawfully discriminate
against the surgeon.25 6 In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that
"[a]t a minimum, the physician must withdraw from performing any
'
invasive procedure which would pose a risk to the patient."257
The
court, however, finding a serious dispute as to whether there was any
risk of transmission, made the patient the "final arbiter."2 Therefore,
the court left intact the hospital's practice restriction and disclosure
requirement."'
Commentators have justly criticized the Behringer court as going too
far by essentially prohibiting an infected surgeon from performing
surgery which presents any risk and requiring disclosure prior to
surgeries that pose no risk.26 This criticism is especially valid in light
of the subsequent effort of the CDC to distinguish between invasive
procedures that do not pose any risk and those that are "exposureprone."26 ' The Behringer court, however, correctly noted that the risks
involved in invasive procedures by HIV-infected surgeons extended

251. Id.at 1260.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1268, 1274.
255. Id. at 1274.
256. Id. at 1283-84. The court, however, did find that the defendants breached their duty to
maintain the confidentiality of the surgeon's medical records. Id at 1273-74.
The "zero
tolerance" approach has bt -n advocated by Gordon Keyes. Keyes, supra note 3, at 605. Larry
Gostin proposes zero tolerance only for procedures which are identified as having serious risk.

See Gostin, supra note I 1,at 308.
257. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Orentlicher, supra note 112, at 1135 (predicting that courts are likely to reject the
zero tolerance standard of Behringer; especially under the ADA). So far Orentlicher's prophecy
does not appear to have come true. See supra text accompanying notes 221-26.
261. See CDC 1991 Recommendations, supra note 7, at 4; supra note Ill (setting out the
efforts of the CDC to draw a line between invasive procedures which pose risk and those which
do not).
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beyond possible transmission.26 2 The court cited expert testimony which
indicated that, should an exposure incident occur, the effect on a patient
likely would be significant.263 In accordance with CDC recommendations for dealing with exposure to HIV, periodic testing would be
indicated.264 Such testing is likely to extend over a number of months
and to cause the patient significant emotional distress and anxiety which
could have been avoided by disclosure.265 On this basis, a fact finder
could view the risk of exposure to infected blood and its consequences,
even short of actual transmission, as a material risk. With respect to the
risk of actual transmission, the court also accepted the view that a
patient would consider the risk of exposure material because of the risk
of death, despite the relatively small probability of transmission. 66
The next case to deal with the duty to disclose HIV infection by a
surgeon was Faya v. Almaraz.267 In that case, two patients sued their
surgeon, who specialized in breast cancer surgery, because he allegedly
failed to disclose to them prior to surgery that he was HIV-infected,
despite his knowledge of his condition.2 6 The complaint alleged
several theories of liability, including negligence, negligent failure to
obtain informed consent, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and battery.269 In addition, the husband of one of the
patients sued for loss of consortium.2 7' The plaintiffs alleged that they
suffered injuries "in the form of exposure to HIV and risk of AIDS,
physical injury and financial cost resulting from surveillance blood
testing . . ., pain, fear, anxiety, grief, nervous shock, severe emotional
distress, headache and sleeplessness."'2 71 On motions by the defendants,
the trial court dismissed the claim on the ground that the plaintiffs did
272
not state a claim because they failed to allege actual exposure to HIV.
Accordingly, the court found that their fear of AIDS was unreasonable

262. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1279.
263. Id.at 1266.
264. Id. See also 1986 CDC Recommendations, supra note II, at 221-23; 1985 CDC
Recommendations, supra note 2, at 681-86, 691-92.
265. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1266. See also supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
266. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1282-83.
267. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
268. Id. at 329-30. The plaintiffs also sued the hospital for allowing the surgeon to operate
without requiring disclosure by the surgeon. Id.
269. Id.at 330.
270. Id.
271. Id.

272. Id.at 330-31. The motions by the surgeon and the hospital were based on a lack of duty
to disclose the illness under the informed consent doctrine and the lack of duty by the hospital to
obtain informed consent. Id.
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as a matter of law.273 The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a
writ of certiorari before the intermediate court could hear the case.274
The high court reversed and remanded the case.2 7 ' The court found
that while the risk of transmission was very low, the surgeon should
have foreseen that an infected surgeon might transmit HIV to his
patients during surgery. 276 Because the risk of harm was death, despite
the low risk, a jury could properly find that the risk was one that a
reasonable physician knew or should have known that a reasonable
patient would regard as material in deciding whether to submit to the
proposed medical treatment.277 Thus, the jury could properly decide
whether the surgeon breached his duty to obtain informed consent.278
In supporting its finding, the court cited the positions stated by the
American Medical Association
recommending disclosure where a
279
significant risk is present.
The Faya court did not address the risk of exposure separately from
the allegation of injury from the fear of AIDS. With respect to the
sufficiency of the allegation of injury, the court found that the plaintiffs'
fear of AIDS was not unreasonable as a matter of law, even absent
specific allegations of exposure or transmission. 28" The court expressed
concern that requiring proof of actual exposure would be too great a
burden because a patient, being unconscious, has no control over the
surgical procedure and has no access to information with which to
prove actual exposure. 28 ' The court then. examined the allegations as to
injuries and concluded that the allegations were sufficient. The court,
however, limited the claim to objectively provable injuries occurring
between the time the plaintiffs reasonably
2 2 should have undergone HIV
results.
negative
of
receipt
the
and
tests
273. Id. at 331. See supra note 110 (citing cases reaching a similar conclusion). The
defendants did not raise the issue of a violation of the ADA if state law required disclosure. This
case could have presented an opportunity to explore the reaches of the ADA and whether a
distinction must be drawn between exposure-prone procedures and merely invasive ones with
reference to disclosure requirements.
274. Faya, 620 A.2d at 331.

275.

Id. at 339.

276. Id. at 333.
277. Id. at 333-34.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 334.
280. Id. at 336-37. See supra note 115, (citing cases which allow plaintiffs to state a claim
without proof of transmission or actual exposure). But see Camillo, supra note 148, at 342
(criticizing Faya's recognition of a claim for fear of AIDS without actual exposure).
281. Faya, 620 A.2d at 337. Cf supra note 102 (discussing the lack of record-keeping of
percutaneous injuries to surgeons during surgery).
282. Faya, 620 A.2d at 337. The court cited evidence which indicated that if transmission had
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In contrast to Faya, in Kerins v. Hartley,283 the California Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's rejection of a claim for mental
anguish, emotional distress, and other damages suffered by the plaintiff
when she discovered that her surgeon was HIV-infected when he
performed surgery on her.284 The patient, in opposing the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, raised the issue of technical battery for
failure of a surgeon to disclose his HIV infection to the plaintiff prior
to surgery because she allegedly conditioned her consent on the good
health of the surgeon."' Before reaching the issue of technical battery,
the appellate court found that the surgeon had not violated any duty to
disclose his infection under the CDC guidelines in effect in 1986, when
the surgery occurred. 286 Thus, the surgeon was not liable for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. 287 The evidence presented in support of
a defense motion for summary judgment indicated that the surgeon had
complied with the recommended universal barrier precautions. 2 8 8 Moreover, the applicable CDC guidelines did not require disclosure of the
surgeon's HIV infection to the patient. 2 9 Because the surgeon had not
breached a duty to use due care, the court concluded that the proximate
cause by a breach of any duty was "questionable."29
occurred, there was a 95% probability that testing would detect transmission within six months of
the exposure. Id. Thus, in this case, the patients, who learned of the possible exposure more than
one year aflter surgery, could recover for injuries which occurred between the time they learned
of the possible exposure and the receipt of negative test results. Id. In this case the plaintiffs were
tested promptly; had they not been, the recovery period would have been limited to the period
between a reasonable time to be tested and receipt of the negative results. Id. at 337 n.10.
283. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
284. Id. at 174.
285. Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (superseded by Kerins
v. Hartley, 860 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1993), and transferred, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994)). Initially, the
appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim, finding that the plaintiff
had sufficiently alleged a technical battery because her consent was expressly conditioned on the
good health of the surgeon and that she had alleged a compensable injury, though not infected with
HIV. Id. The battery claim was based on the surgeons allegedly intentional deviation from the
consent given. Id. at 626. The Supreme Court of California, however, in Kerins v. Hartley, 868
P.2d 906, 906 (Cal. 1994), transferred the appeal back to the appellate court with directions to
vacate and reconsider the decision in light of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.. 863 P.2d 795.
811 (Cal. 1993), a case holding that there could be no recovery for negligently inflicted fear of
cancer induced by toxic exposure in the absence of proof that it was probable that cancer would
develop in the future. The effect of this rule as applied to HIV-exposure is to bar any claim for
negligent exposure or failure to disclose in the absence of proof of actual transmission because the
likelihood of transmission is less than 50% in virtually any HIV-exposure not involving large
amounts of infected bodily fluids.
286. Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.at 177-78.
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The Kerins court then proceeded to assume that a duty to disclose
existed, but, following Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,29' the
court found that there was no cognizable claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. 92 The plaintiff's alleged fear of AIDS was
unreasonable as a matter of law because any exposure event that might
29 3
have occurred would have been unlikely to lead to HIV infection.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's theory of oppressive, fraudulent,
or malicious conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress
because the risk was "statistically insignificant." 94 Likewise, the court
rejected the technical battery claim. 95
The Kerins court did not actually address the existence of the
surgeon's duty under the informed consent doctrine to inform the
patient of the risk of HIV transmission or the risk of exposure to HIV
during surgery.296 The court never examined the question of whether
a reasonable patient would consider the information material. The
court, however, hinted that the risk would be nonmaterial to a reasonable patient by calling the risk of transmission "statistically insignificant., 297 The court appeared to apply a standard of disclosure based
solely on the CDC's 1986 guidelines (which, unlike the 1991 guidelines, were silent on1disclosure), 298 not on the patient-centered standard
adopted by California.299 The case was never clearly presented as an
informed consent case, and the court never clearly dealt with informed
consent. Had the court done so, the result probably would have been
the same under the Potter rule. The court, however, seemed to confuse
the "duty to disclose" with the "duty to exercise due care in the actual
performance of the surgery," a different issue altogether.
The Kerins court used the usual "parade of horribles" to justify
closing courts to claims by anyone exposed to HIV through the
negligent conduct of another. The court stated that the magnitude of the
potential class of plaintiffs "cannot be overstated." 3 ° Apparently, the

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 181.
296. The Kerins court applied the 1986 CDC guidelines, which did not require disclosure of
infection, but the 1991 guidelines require disclosure if an expert review panel permits the surgeon
to perform an exposure-prone procedure. Id. at 177. See also 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra
note 7, at 5.
297. Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
298. Compare 1986 CDC Recommendations, supra note H, with 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note 7.
299. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I, 11 (Cal. 1972).
300. Kerins. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178.
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court feared that allowing patients to sue for nondisclosure would lead
30
to other cases alleging exposure in a variety of other circumstances. 1
Frankly, this is the typical hyperbole courts use when attempting to
bolster a restriction of access to the courts. While the fear of an
overburdened court system resulting from frivolous claims is a
legitimate concern in determining the scope of liability, this fear rarely
is enough justification on its own to carry much weight, as the expansion of recovery for injuries once denied for this very reason illustrates.
Moreover, the doctrine of informed consent regarding HIV is not
applicable in cases involving school, workplace, or home contamination.
Thus, fear-of-AIDS cases would not necessarily proliferate beyond the
courts' capacity should informed consent cases based on nondisclosure
of a surgeon's infection be permitted to go to a jury.
The Kerins court also expressed concerns about inconsistent results
and discouraging settlements and early resolution. 0 2 If courts were to
base the right to recover on the likelihood of settlements, early
resolution, and consistent jury verdicts, very few negligence claims or
tort claims of any type would survive. Exactly how informed consent
cases involving HIV-infected surgeons would discourage settlements or
early resolution of claims is unstated and unclear. Moreover, the
diversity of jury verdicts on virtually any type of claim is obvious. For
example, one simply has to look at informed consent cases to understand the diversity of opinion on what constitutes a significant or
material risk to a reasonable person. 30 3 Fear of inconsistent verdicts is
simply not a persuasive basis for closing access to the courts.
Finally, the Kerins court raised the specter that fear-of-AIDS cases
would compromise the availability and affordability of health insurance,
malpractice insurance, and health care. 30 4 The court, however, did not
support this assumption by citing any empirical data. Likewise, the
court made a factually unsupported argument that fear-of-AIDS cases
would drain the resources of defendants and their insureds at the
expense of those who actually contract HIV from such defendants. °5
Other courts have resolved this potential problem by limiting damages
to the period of time between a reasonable time to be tested following
discovery of exposure and the time necessary to receive negative test
results. 3 6 Given this reasonable limitation and the relative rarity of

301.
(Cal. Ct.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 178-79 (quoting Herbert v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 712
App. 1994)).
Id. at 179.
See Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 403 (La. 1988) (citing relevant cases).
Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 115.
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actual transmission in any circumstances, the coffers of defendants and
their insurers will not likely run dry anytime soon. Despite the fears
expressed by the Kerins court, an explosion of cases does not appear to
have occurred in those states which allow claims based on negligent
exposure to HIV.30 7
Only one other reported case, KA.C.v. Benson,3"' has dealt with a
patient's claim for failure to disclose by an HIV-infected physician.
Initially, over fifty patients of an HIV-infected family practitioner sued
seeking recovery based on, among other theories, negligent nondisclosure.3"9 The suits were filed after the Minnesota Board of Medical
Examiners notified 336 patients that a physician who was HIV-infected
had performed invasive procedures while he was gloved but suffering
from exudative dermatitis.310 Pending the decision by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, all but one of the patients settled their claims
against the defendants.31 '
The court held that "a plaintiff must allege actual exposure to HIV
in order to establish a claim for emotional damages resulting from a
'
fear of contracting AIDS."312
The court concluded that because the
plaintiff did not allege actual contact with the physician's infected
bodily fluids, she was not in the "zone of danger," because the
possibility was never more than very remote.3" 3 On the issue of
negligent nondisclosure, the K.A.C. court found that even had the
physician breached his duty to disclose, the plaintiff had no compensa-

307. In Georgia, nearly 500 patients of an HIV-infected dentist who hid his infection settled
a class action suit for $850,000 against the dentist's employer based on battery. Patients of Dentist
Who Died of AIDS to Split Settlement, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Sept. 8, 1994, at C6.
308. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
309. Id. at 555-56.
310. Id.at 556-57. The letter notifying these patients was actually signed by the physician and
indicated that a "minimal risk" existed during certain medical procedures. Id. at 557. The letter
recommended that the patients be tested for HIV and stressed the importance of testing. Id. The
trial court dismissed the claims because of the failure to allege actual blood exposure during any
of the procedures performed by the physician. Id. at 555. The intermediate appellate court
reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding that the plaintiffs had made sufficient showing of
exposure because the physician, who was HIV-infected and was suffering from exudative
dermatitis, placed his gloved hands in the patients' bodily cavities, thus placing the patients in the
"zone of danger." Id. The court limited the recovery for fear of exposure to HIV to the period
between learning of the possible exposure and receipt of negative test results. Id. The court then
reversed the trial court's summary judgment on the issue of the duty to disclose, finding that the
plaintiffs had submitted sufficient evidence on the standard of care in the medical community
regarding the duty to disclose HIV-infection prior to performing invasive procedures to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. K.A.C. v. Benson, No. C6-93-1203, 1993 WL 515825 at *1,*7
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993).
311. K.A.C, 527 N.W.2d at 556.
312. Id. at 555.
313. Id. at 558.
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ble harm because the "minuscule 'risk' of HIV exposure" never
materialized. 3 4 The court, however, expressly did not address the issue
of whether a physician has a duty to disclose HIV infection to patients.3 15
VII. CONCLUSION

A review of the medical and legal literature, statutes, regulations, and
cases dealing with the issue of disclosure by HIV-infected surgeons
indicates a wide diversity of opinion. The 1991 CDC recommendations,
requiring disclosure under some conditions, have not been widely
adopted by the states.3 6 A few states following the CDC's recommendations require disclosure by statute or regulation. 317 While most states
have not required disclosure by statute or regulation, 3" no appellate
courts have explicitly found that the risks presented are immaterial.
Some courts have considered the risk posed by HIV-infected surgeons
sufficiently serious to allow employers of infected surgeons to restrict
their practices by revoking surgical privileges or by imposing disclosure
requirements. 3 9 At least one state supreme court has allowed the
disclosure issue to go to a jury.32 Other courts have avoided the issue
by finding no harm from nondisclosure.32'
With the diversity of opinion in the medical and legal communities,
some calling for infected surgeons to refrain from performing exposure-

314. Id.
315. Id. at 561. The court did note that physicians "have a duty to disclose [those] risks of
death or serious bodily harm which are a significant probability," and those risks which a
physician in good standing in the community would reveal. Id. Moreover, to the extent they are
known by the physician, there is a duty to disclose risks to which a patient attaches particular
significance, even if they are otherwise not serious enough to be disclosed. Id. In dissenting from
the opinion, Justice Page criticized the majority's reading of previous Minnesota cases by stating
that the majority ignored the patient's rights in the decision making process established by those
cases. Id. at 562. According to the dissent, the physician should not only reveal risks of death
or serious harm, and those which a physician in good standing would reveal, but also those which
the physician knew or should have known that the particular patient would consider significant,
including risks that the physician knew or should have known a reasonable patient would consider
significant. Id. at 563. In Justice Page's view, there was a sufficient issue of fact for the jury to
decide the issue of the duty to disclose. Id. Moreover, Justice Page believed there was sufficient
harm alleged, emotional distress from the nondisclosure, to reach a jury on the issue of harm. Id.
at 564.
316. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 112.
318. See supra note 113.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 201-35 and 248-66.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 267-82.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 283-305.
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prone procedures, 32 2 while others insist that no restrictions, other than
rigorous infection controls, should be imposed,3 23 the patient is left to
wonder what the appropriate action should be. The patient should, in
light of such diversity, have the last word. Just as our legal system in
the near future is likely to require disclosure to patients of a physician's
experience and validly compiled success rate data for use in selecting
a physician,3 24 patients should be permitted to make choices on the
kinds and size of risks they are willing to encounter from otherwise
competent physicians, at least in the range within which reasonable
persons might disagree.
Some patients may choose to use an HIV-infected surgeon in spite of
the infection. Other factors, such as extraordinary skill of the surgeon,
may well militate against going elsewhere for the procedure.32 If the
risks involved in surgery are not sufficient to exclude the physician
from performing the procedure by consensus in the medical and legal
communities, but the procedure involves risks that are likely to be
material to a reasonable patient, the patient should have the right to
determine whether to take the risk.
Those who argue that the risk of transmission is so insignificant that
it should not be considered significant under the antidiscrimination
statutes or material under the doctrine of informed consent generally
ignore the impact on patients when informed that they have been
exposed to HIV. Despite the fact that the risk of seroconversion is
relatively small, public health authorities still regard it seriously enough
to recommend that in such exposure incidents the patient should be
tested.326 The potentially serious emotional disturbance that such a
process is likely to cause even in the most "rational" 32' 7 must not simply
be ignored. Education of the public about the size and nature of the
risk may help in reducing the fear and anxiety about AIDS, but as long
as there remains a significant risk that exposure incidents will occur, the
patient should have the right to elect to avoid the risk of such exposure.

322. Eg., Gostin, supra note I ll, at 303; Keyes, supra note 3, at 605.
323. Barnes et al., supra note 3,at 324.
324. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 160, at 34.
325. Orentlicher, supra note 107, at 1136.
326. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
327. As noted by Twerski and Cohen, "[P]eople simply do not make decisions in an
objectively rational way." Twerski & Cohen, supra note 50, at 627. This is true whether the
decisions are being made by laymen or scientists. Id. While the law should not bolster or
encourage irrational and unreasonable fears by awarding damages when such fears arise, the law
must be realistic in what it expects of human beings whose ability to be purely objective, rational,
and unemotional is limited. In essence the law does allow recovery when there is a wrongfully
caused harm and the fear is a reasonable emotion, but not necessarily purely rational or purely
logical.
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An academic understanding of the risks is not likely to alleviate
seriously the fear and anxiety which are likely to result from exposure.
Certainly the law should protect infected persons from unjust and
unnecessary discrimination.

Because society puts physicians at risk of

contracting HIV by prohibiting discrimination against HIV-positive
patients, society may indeed owe special obligations to assist physicians
should transmission occur as a result. As long as society recognizes
and promotes patient autonomy, however, the law should not ride
roughshod over the right of individuals to control their own very
personal decisions about health care. Rather, the law must take into
account the very real and often reasonable concerns that patients have
about the serious impact of risks of exposure to deadly diseases as well
as actual transmission.

